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Abstract
We study how unemployment benefi t eligibility affects the layoff exit rate by exploiting quasi-
experimental variation in eligibility rules in Italy. By using a difference-indifferences estimator, 
we fi nd an instantaneous increase of about 12% in the layoff probability when unemployment 
benefi t eligibility is attained, which persists for about 16 weeks. These fi ndings are robust to 
different identifying assumptions and are mostly driven by jobs started after the onset of 
the Great Recession, in the South and for small fi rms. We argue that the moral hazard from the 
employer’s side is the main force driving these layoffs.
Keywords: unemployment insurance, layoffs, employer–employee moral hazard, difference-
in-differences, heterogeneous effects.
JEL classifi cation: C31, C41, J21, J63, J65.
Resumen
Este trabajo estudia el papel que desempeñan las condiciones de acceso a la prestación por 
desempleo sobre la tasa de despidos. Para ello, se explota la variación cuasi experimental 
en los criterios de elegibilidad para el subsidio de desempleo en Italia, a través de una 
estimación de diferencias en diferencias. Los resultados destacan que la probabilidad de despido 
aumenta alrededor del 12 % en el momento en que los trabajadores alcanzan la elegibilidad 
para el subsidio de desempleo, y ese efecto persiste durante 16 semanas. Estos resultados 
se mantienen utilizando diferentes estrategias de estimación, y se explican, en gran parte, por 
las relaciones laborales que empezaron después de la Gran Recesión, en el sur de Italia y en 
empresas pequeñas. Razonamos que la principal fuerza impulsora de este efecto es el riesgo 
moral por parte de las empresas.
Palabras clave: subsidio de desempleo, despidos, riesgo moral empresario-trabajador, 
diferencias en diferencias, efectos heterogéneos.
Códigos JEL: C31, C41, J21, J63, J65.
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1 Introduction
The main purpose of unemployment insurance (UI) is to provide income support during unem-
ployment in case of job loss. The design of UI, however, entails a trade-off between insurance
and incentives. This may lead to a moral hazard problem, which induces the insured unem-
ployed to search less intensively. The empirical literature has extensively analysed the effect
of unemployment benefits (UBs) on unemployment spell duration (Card and Levine, 2000;
Lalive et al., 2006; van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006; Lalive, 2008; Tatsiramos and van Ours,
2014; Schmieder and von Wachter, 2016). The results generally show that the generosity of
UB prolongs unemployment duration, suggesting that the insured unemployed may behave
opportunistically while searching for jobs.
Beyond its well-known effects during unemployment, UI may induce a moral hazard be-
haviour in both employers and employees, which can alter job separation rates. On the demand
side, firms may have an incentive to exploit the UI system to adjust their workforce in case
of negative demand shocks (Feldstein, 1976). On the supply side, workers may have a prefer-
ence for leisure combined with UB compensation. In this case, they have an incentive to work
just long enough to attain UB eligibility and then exit employment. Understanding the relative
importance of these two behaviours is fundamental as it entails different policy implications.
While employees’ moral hazard may imply reduced UI generosity, employers’ moral hazard
could support the introduction of firing taxes to prevent excessive layoffs (Zweimüller, 2018).
In this paper, we aim to estimate the causal effect of UB eligibility on layoff probability
and to provide some insight on the role of the employer and employee’s moral hazard. Our
contribution to the literature is threefold.
First, we bring new evidence by exploiting quasi-experimental variation in UB eligibility
conditions in Italy.1 The analysis relies on an inflow sample of more than 400,000 new jobs
drawn from administrative registries covering the period of 2005 to 2012, which we follow until
job separation. We identify the impact of attaining UB eligibility by exploiting two eligibility
conditions in the Italian UI system: i) at least 52 working weeks in the last two calendar years
and ii) at least one day of work before this two-year horizon. Identifying the effect of UI
eligibility is challenging since it is confounded by the effect of work experience accumulated
along the job spell. To control for this confounder, we add a control group of workers who
cannot attain UB eligibility despite accumulating the same level of work experience over the
last two years. This extends the standard before-and-after analysis previously implemented in
the literature in the same spirit of a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator.
1In contrast to the empirical literature on unemployment duration, the effects of UI on layoffs have received
little attention. An old literature focused on the impact of the UI system on the layoff rate in the United States
(Feldstein, 1976, 1978; Saffer, 1983; Topel, 1984, 1983; Anderson and Meyer, 1993). Within the more recent
empirical literature, only two papers have studied the impact of UI on the probability of layoff: Rebollo-Sanz
(2012) for Spain and Light and Omori (2004) for the United States. See Section 2 for more details.
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and the worker’s side by exploiting the large sample of new jobs in two ways. First, we estimate
heterogeneous effects before and after 2008, the onset of the Great Recession, when the forces
at work determining the incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviour may have changed.
On the one hand, in downturns, employers may be more tempted to exploit the UI system in
order to reduce their firing costs. On the other hand, workers should have lower incentives
to shirk because in bad times it is more difficult to find a new job in case of layoff. Second,
we try to understand the role of employers’ firing costs. In Italy during the period of the
analysis, the employment protection legislation (EPL) on individual layoffs was more stringent
for firms with more than 15 employees. Hence, smaller firms could more easily offer job
packages that included the wage and a probability of being laid off (Zweimüller, 2018), thereby
taking advantage of the UI system to adjust their workforce. From these contrasting expected
behavioural changes, we shed new light on the two sides of moral hazard.
As a third contribution, we provide evidence that the impact of UB eligibility on layoffs in
Italy is not homogeneous across regions, despite these being characterised by the same labour
market institutions. We focus on a particular geographical dimension that is related to the
puzzling and long-lasting North–South divide in Italy (e.g. Manacorda and Petrongolo, 2006)
and is reflected in differences in socio-economic measures, social norms and the ability to
cooperate (Banfield, 1958; Guiso et al., 2004; Bigoni et al., 2016, 2018). Our conjecture is that
a low level of trust in the south of Italy may induce employees and employers to easily feel
justified in adopting opportunistic behaviour and in being part of an implicit contract affected
by moral hazard.2
Our results confirm the existence of moral hazard, which we argue to be demand-induced.
According to our preferred specification, we find that immediately after reaching UI eligibility,
the probability of layoff increases by 12% for about 16 weeks. The impact is significantly
larger after the Great Recession, when the instantaneous increase is of 21%, while no effect is
found before 2008. In the South, the effect peaks at 24% between nine and 16 weeks from UI
eligibility, whereas in the rest of Italy, the overall effect is not significantly different from zero.
The layoff rates in smaller firms also show a more pronounced reaction. Similar conclusions
are reached if we rely on a regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimator identifying the
effect around the 52 weeks eligibility threshold.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical setting and re-
view the existing empirical literature. Section 3 presents the Italian institutional framework for
the period under analysis. Section 4 describes the data and the sample. Section 5 shows some
descriptive evidence and results based on a RDD framework. Section 6 presents our preferred
model, a DiD design in a duration model, and interprets the results. Section 7 concludes.
2Eugster et al. (2017) exploited the cultural differences across the Swiss language areas to study the impact of
culture on job search behaviour. They found that unemployment duration is longer in Latin language areas com-
pared to German-speaking ones. Eugster et al. (2011) found that Latin language areas have a higher preference
for redistributive social insurance compared to German language areas.
Second, we provide new insights on the relative importance of moral hazard on the firm’s
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2 Theoretical framework and existing evidence
In the standard Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model with endogenous job destruction, jobs
are destroyed when an idiosyncratic shock decreases job productivity below a reservation level
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). According to this model, UBs improve the employee’s out-
side option, which raises the reservation productivity threshold of the job and, therefore, the
job separation probability. Specific supply and demand factors may affect the behaviour of the
agents and create a moral hazard to exploit the UI system.
On the labour supply side, the positive shock on the outside option may induce the worker
to reduce their exerted effort. Therefore, the more generous the UB compensation, the higher
the probability for the worker of being fired or of inducing a layoff (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984;
Jurajda, 2002). Furthermore, there may be cases in which a worker may prefer an intermittent
working pattern in which periods of work, long enough to reach UB eligibility, are alternated
with periods under UB compensation. Knowing this preference, it might be convenient for a
firm to have a policy of only firing workers who qualify for UI. More workers will apply to this
firm, knowing its reputation for timing its layoffs with UI eligibility. The firm will therefore
reduce the costs of filling the vacancy and be able to choose candidates from a larger pool
(Christofides and McKenna, 1996; Green and Sargent, 1998).
On the labour demand side, at least two arguments may explain a boost in dismissals. First,
UB eligibility may attenuate firms’ expected separation costs due to possible litigation disputes.
In some countries, like Italy, judges can have significant discretionary power to determine if
a layoff is legitimate. In this context, they might more often rule in favour of the firm if
the worker is eligible for UB, lowering the expected firing costs for employees entitled to
UB and creating an incentive to wait until UI eligibility is attained before firing. Second,
according to implicit contract models, the job relationship between workers and firms relies on
implicit contracts that take into account the wage and a positive probability of layoff due to
future macroeconomic uncertainty. In the presence of a UI system, firms use temporary layoffs
and the availability of UB compensation to adjust the workforce to macroeconomic conditions
(Feldstein, 1976; Baily, 1977). In addition, based on a job search model with UI insurance,
Jurajda (2003) shows that a firm’s optimal layoff strategy when facing a cyclical downturn is to
fire workers with generous UB entitlements. This is because the firm internalises the fact that
these individuals will search less intensively and remain unemployed longer. Therefore, once
economic conditions improve, the firms may recall them more easily.
Finally, UBs may generate collusive behaviour between employers and employees, in which
they share the surplus of UBs by officially terminating the employment relationship but main-
taining it off the books.
The empirical literature focusing on the impact of UB eligibility on employment duration
has been quite limited.3 Earlier studies for the United States in general showed that tempo-
rary layoffs were more common when UI was not fully funded by experience rating (Feldstein,
4
2014; Inderbitzin et al., 2016).
3A related literature studied UB provision as an alternative policy to early retirement (Baguelin and Remillon,
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1976, 1978; Saffer, 1983; Topel, 1984, 1983; Anderson and Meyer, 1993).4 A few North Amer-
ican empirical studies exploited exogenous changes in the eligibility rules for UBs to study the
impact of UB eligibility on employment duration by means of a DiD approach. Solon (1984)
used the fact that since 1983, voluntary resignation conferred the right to UBs in some US
states. Although his results were imprecise, they were compatible with the hypothesis that
more stringent conditions for UBs reduce job quitting, supporting the moral hazard hypothe-
sis. Green and Riddell (1997) and Baker and Rea (1998) studied the impact of a reform that
changed the UB eligibility conditions in Canada in 1990. They found that UB eligibility in-
creased the hazard rate out of employment. Finally, other studies investigated the effect of a
3-year extension of UBs targeted at older workers in Austria during the late 1980s. Based on
DiD approaches, the authors estimated an increase of about 4–11 percentage points in the entry
rate into unemployment (Winter-Ebmer, 2003) and a 28% increase in the job separation rate
(Lalive et al., 2015).
Another strand of the literature estimated duration models to identify the impact of UB
eligibility on employment duration without exploiting exogenous reforms of the UI system.
For the United States, Jurajda (2002) considered the period of 1974–1979 (i.e. before the UI
reform) and showed that the attaining UB eligibility decreased the duration of employment.
Furthermore, by exploiting cross-state and cross-year variation in UB calculations, Light and
Omori (2004) found that more generous UBs deterred workers from voluntary job quitting. For
Canada, Christofides and McKenna (1995, 1996) and Green and Sargent (1998) showed that
in the late 1980s, the employment exit rate increased after attaining UB eligibility, suggesting
moral hazard as an explanation. A more recent paper focused on Europe. Rebollo-Sanz (2012)
studied the effect of reaching UB eligibility on employment duration in Spain. The author
compared the outcomes before and after reaching UB eligibility and found a positive effect of
UB eligibility on layoffs, but not on job quitting. She focused on job episodes that had not yet
met UB requirements before the start of the spell and that had different levels of accumulated
working weeks at the beginning of the spell. The author controlled for total past experience,
a baseline hazard rate for duration dependence and UB eligibility dummies. However, as UB
eligibility is attained by accumulating work experience along the spell, the author could not
separate the effect of UI from the experience effect, which remained a confounding factor. As
explained in Section 6, compared to this evaluation strategy, we make a step forward and, in
a DiD setting, disentangle the effect of work experience accumulated along the spell from the
job duration dependence.
4In an experience-rated UI system, firms pay UI taxes that are proportional to their use of the UI system, which is
an implicit tax on firing aiming to reduce excess layoffs.
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3 Institutional set-up
In this section, we briefly describe the Italian institutional set-up of the UI system and the EPL.
Both institutions can indeed interact and affect layoffs. Both the labour market institutions
regulating the UI system and firing practices have changed in the last two decades. In what
follows, we focus the discussion on the period under analysis, which goes from 2005 to 2012.
3.1 Firing system
In terms of the legislation of layoffs, Italy was historically characterised by significant rigidities.
The EPL for open-ended contracts was, for example, one of the strictest among the OECD
countries.5 The highest source of rigidity was related to the dismissal of individual workers:
the employer could only fire an employee if there was a fair reason. An individual dismissal
was considered to be fair when it was motivated by situations referred to as just cause, just
objective motive or just subjective motive.
• Just cause referred to cases of serious worker misconduct that impeded the development
of a trustful labour relationship between both parties. Dismissal for just cause was a last
resort solution and occurred without notice.6
• Just objective motive referred to economic reasons for termination. The employer had to
prove that, due to economic reasons, (i) the company had to be reorganised and (ii) the
employee could not be transferred to other functions within the company (not necessarily
the functions the worker was hired for) or to other companies in the same group (Law
604/66).
• Just subjective motive referred to employee misconduct. This is similar to just cause but
for less serious misconduct, and the layoff had to occur with notice.
In all cases, the burden of proof of the fairness of the layoff laid with the employer (Bal-
lestrero, 2012). If the court declared that the dismissal was unfair, then workers in firms with
more than 15 employees could be reinstated in the workplace and receive compensation equal
to the remuneration foregone until reintegration with a minimum of five months of salary (Ar-
ticle 18, Law 300/1970). Workers in firms with less than 15 employees were not entitled to
5According to the 2012 OECD indicator on the strictness of EPL, Italy ranked fourth after Portugal, the Czech
Republic and the Netherlands.
6Examples of misconduct leading to a dismissal for just cause include abandoning the workplace if this harms
the safety of people or the plant, unjustified absence from the workplace for multiple days, a false medical
certificate, refusal to take up work again after sick leave, insubordination, having a second job whose interests
are in conflict with the company’s activities, defamation of the company, having committed a crime not related
to the company but that could harm the company’s reputation, theft of company holdings of substantial value and
badge falsification.
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than 15 employees dealt with larger expected firing costs.7
Labour disputes in Italy could take years before settlement. This implied uncertain and
substantial costs for firms in case of loss. In 2006, the average duration of disputes for layoffs
was 718 days for first instance trials and 646 days for second instance trials. Workers won
in 2/3 and 1/3 of cases in first and second instance trials, respectively (ISTAT, 2008). High
expected costs in case of loss and the discretionary power of labour courts to determine whether
a dismissal was fair were a strong deterrent for employers looking to fire workers.
3.2 Unemployment insurance system
The Italian UI system sheltered private sector salaried workers who incurred an involuntary
job loss or resigned for ‘just cause’8 and satisfied the following eligibility conditions related
to one’s previous employment history. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the UB
eligibility rules:
C.1. ‘weeks requirement’: the worker needs at least 52 full-time working weeks during the
biennium before the end of the job spell (i.e. C.1 biennium in Figure 1);
C.2. ‘experience requirement’: the worker needs at least one day of work in the period before
the C.1 biennium (C.2 period in Figure 1).




C.2: at least 1 day of work C.1: full-time working weeks ≥ 52
Calendar time t
C.2 period C.1 biennium
Following termination, the jobless workers satisfying C.1 and C.2 had to officially register
their unemployment status at one of the local public employment offices in order to collect UB
payments. UBs were provided for seven months up until 2007 and for eight months after 2007.
The UB amount was related to one’s gross remuneration in the three months before the job loss
and was capped (i.e. e1014 in 2007). The replacement rate decreased along the unemployment
spell. Until 2007, it was 50% during the first 6 months and dropped to 40% afterwards. After
2007, the replacement rate was increased by 10 percentage points (Law 247/2007).9
7The regulation on dismissals was changed in January 2013 by Law 92/2012.
8Examples of resignation for ‘just cause’ are: mobbing, having suffered sexual harassment in the workplace,
delayed or missed wage payments, deterioration in work tasks and being moved to a different establishment
without organizational or technical reasons.
9For workers older than 50 years of age at job loss, before (after) 2008 the maximum duration was 10 (12) months,
with a replacement rate of 30% (40%) from the 10th (9th) month.
reintegration and the compensation was between 2.5 and six months. Hence, firms with more
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Workers who did not fully qualify for UBs could be eligible for a reduced version, which
were much less generous but were subject to looser criteria. These reduced UBs were paid all
at once in the calendar year after the job loss. Until 2007, they covered the same number of
days worked during the year before the job loss, with a maximum of five months and a (capped)
replacement rate of 30%. From 2008, the maximum number of months was raised to six and
the replacement rate increased to 35% for the first 120 days and 40% afterwards.
4 Data and sample
4.1 Data
We use administrative data from the social security registers of the Italian Social Security Insti-
tute (LoSai INPS). The overall sample available for research has a longitudinal structure up to
2015 and covers 6.5% of all salaried and semi-subordinate employees10 working in the private
sector. The data contains individual employment histories since 1985, unemployment benefit
receipts from 1999 and other information on assimilated working weeks (e.g. sickness, mater-
nity leave, military service, short-term compensation). The unit of observation is the single job
contract. For each contract, the dataset provides information on the start and termination date,
termination reason, location, firm sector, firm size, qualification and type of contract. It also
contains worker characteristics such as gender and year of birth.
We selected a sample of fresh job spells starting between January 1st 2005 and December
31st 2011. We excluded job spells beginning prior to 2005 because the job starting date and the
job termination reason were unavailable. We followed job spells until the end of 2012 because
in 2013, labour market regulations changed. We excluded apprenticeships from our sample
because apprentices were eligible for UBs only in special cases. We also exclude, contracts in
agriculture due to the high seasonality of job relations in this sector and the specific UB rules.
This selection resulted in an initial sample of 1,766,405 fresh job spells. The main outcome
variable of interest in the analysis is job duration until separation, T , which is measured every
two weeks from hiring. Job spells can terminate for different reasons. From the information in
LoSai, we can distinguish among the three main causes of job exit: i) firm layoff; ii) employee’s
voluntary resignation; and iii) end of a temporary or seasonal job. If an individual experienced
a job interruption of less than three weeks and then restarted working in the same firm, we
consider the two jobs as the same uninterrupted spell. By doing so, contract transformations
are considered as unique job spells.11 We denote by Z the random variable indicating the
10Semi-subordinate employees are workers with contracts for temporary collaborations that are de facto subordi-
nate to the employer but formally self-employed.
11This is especially important for the renewing of temporary contracts because in Italy, multiple renewals of
temporary contracts were allowed if there was a waiting time of 20 (10) days between the end of the old and the
beginning of the new contract when the duration of the old contract was (less) more than six months.
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accumulated full-time working weeks in the C.1 biennium. This random variable is indexed
as Zt to indicate the accumulated working weeks in a particular elapsed duration t of the job
spell.12
4.2 Treatment definition
At the start of the job spell (t = 0), we calculate the accumulated working weeks Zt=0 during
the initial C.1 biennium. Then, we update the value of Zt at the end of each t until the end of
the spell, with t ticking two weeks. The calculation of Zt is based on the mobile biennium C.1,
which moves along the spell duration. For a given t, the end of the mobile biennium coincides
with the calendar time t periods after the start of the job. The beginning of the mobile biennium
is calculated going back two years.
While requirement C.1 is standard in UI systems (although the exact numbers vary from
country to country), requirement C.2 is an Italian peculiarity. If employers and/or employees
time an opportunistic behaviour with UI eligibility, we expect to see an increase in the layoff
probability when Zt reaches 52 (i.e. when C.1 is satisfied) only for spells that also satisfy
criterion C.2. We define these units as ‘treated’, while those not satisfying criterion C.2 are
our ‘controls’, who cannot claim UB eligibility even when Zt turns equal to 52. We define the
treatment status at the beginning of the spell, i.e. when t = 0. Figure 2 clarifies the differences
between the two groups by way of a calendar timeline: the only difference is in the employment
history during the C.2 period: the treated group worked at least one day, whereas the controls
had no days of work.
Figure 2: Treated and control group definitions
(a) Treated: satisfy C.2 but not C.1 at the job spell start
−2 years
from job spell start
t = 0
job spell start
working days > 0 Z0 job duration
Calendar time t
(b) Controls: satisfy neither C.2 nor C.1 at the job spell start
−2 years
from job spell start
t = 0
job spell start
working days = 0 Z0 job duration
Calendar time t
C.2 period C.1 biennium
12In what follows, we express random variables in upper case and their particular realizations in lower case.
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4.3 Sample selection
We further narrowed our sample as follows. First, we removed the jobs that satisfied UB
eligibility requirement C.1 from the beginning of the spell (i.e. Z0 ≥ 52). This is because we
want to observe how the job separation rate evolves before and after attaining UB eligibility.
Second, we dropped the spells of individuals who, at the moment of hiring, had more than two
years of past employment experience in the C.2 period. This selection criterion is to ensure that
the treated and the controls are not too different in terms of past employment histories. Third,
we dropped spells of workers older than 60 at the start of the job. Finally, we removed spells
lying in the bottom or the top percentile of the hourly wage distribution and part-time jobs. The
final sample is made up of 424,473 fresh job spells, translating into 6,110,657 observations (i.e.
potential job terminations every two weeks). A total of 184,676 spells belong to treated group
(43.5%), while 239,797 are controls.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on completed and uncompleted spells. We right-censored
all of the spells still ongoing at the end of 2012 or surviving after 104 weeks of tenure (28,568
spells). The first right-censoring is due to the end of the observed time window. The second
was applied because both C.1 and C.2 were always satisfied after 104 weeks of elapsed job
duration and all spells would move to the treated group. Similarly, we right-censored a further
30,290 spells belonging to the control units as soon as they satisfied C.2, since otherwise they
would shift to the treated group from that moment onwards. About 11.5% of the job spells
ended because of layoff. This fraction is larger for the treated (13.2%) than for the controls
(10.2%).
Table 1: Summary statistics of job spell durations by treatment status
Total Treated Controls
Number of job spells
Total 424,473 184,676 239,797
Completed due to layoff 48,636 24,293 24,343
Completed due to resignation or end of temporary contract 316,979 141,417 175,562
Right-censored on 31/12/2012 or at 104 weeks 28,568 18,966 9,602
Right-censored when controls become treated 30,290 0 30,290
Fraction of right-censored spells 0.139 0.103 0.166
Fraction of completed spells due to layoff 0.115 0.132 0.102
Fraction of completed spells due to resignation or end of temporary contract 0.747 0.766 0.732
Average job duration (weeks) 28.844 30.932 27.235
Duration percentiles (weeks)
10th 4 4 4
25th 8 8 8
50th 18 18 16
75th 40 42 38
Figure C.1 in Appendix C shows the distribution of Z0 for the treated and control groups.
Both groups share very similar absolute frequencies at all values of Z0 apart from zero, when it
is higher for the control group. Table 2 reports summary statistics of the observables that we use
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1904
as covariates in the following analyses. We control for individual characteristics (age at spell
start and gender), variables capturing past employment history (whether one already benefited
of income support in the past and some employment features of the last year), characteristics
of the job spell under analysis (contract type, firm size, location and calendar time of the job
spell start) and the regional GDP growth rate (which varies over the spell).13 The treated and
control groups do not differ in many characteristics. The most notable differences are age (the
treated are 3.8 years older, on average) and a variable work experience before hiring. These
differences are to be expected as the treatment status depends on past employment history.
Table 2: Summary statistics of the covariates by treatment status
Whole sample
——————————————— Treated Controls
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Mean
Individual characteristics
Age at the start of the job spell (years) 28.428 8.274 15.000 60.000 30.558 26.787
Woman 0.332 0.471 0.000 1.000 0.320 0.341
Ever received income support of any type 0.054 0.227 0.000 1.000 0.120 0.004
Blue-collar job in calendar year before the start of the job spell 0.320 0.467 0.000 1.000 0.433 0.233
Employment contract in the calendar year before the start of the job spell
Open-ended contract 0.127 0.333 0.000 1.000 0.176 0.089
Temporary contract 0.298 0.457 0.000 1.000 0.359 0.251
Seasonal employment 0.046 0.209 0.000 1.000 0.063 0.032
No employment 0.530 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.403 0.628
Characteristics of the job spell
Firm size
5 employees or less 0.277 0.447 0.000 1.000 0.288 0.268
Between 6 and 15 employees 0.187 0.390 0.000 1.000 0.189 0.186
Between 15 and 50 employees 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000 0.169 0.167
Between 51 and 100 employees 0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 0.186 0.190
More than 100 employees 0.180 0.384 0.000 1.000 0.167 0.190
Type of contract
Open-ended 0.345 0.475 0.000 1.000 0.350 0.341
Temporary 0.601 0.490 0.000 1.000 0.591 0.609
Seasonal 0.054 0.225 0.000 1.000 0.058 0.050
Geographical area
North-West 0.287 0.453 0.000 1.000 0.269 0.302
North-East 0.247 0.431 0.000 1.000 0.236 0.255
Centre 0.180 0.384 0.000 1.000 0.178 0.182
South 0.193 0.395 0.000 1.000 0.211 0.179
Islands 0.093 0.290 0.000 1.000 0.107 0.082
Year at the start of the spell
2005 0.128 0.335 0.000 1.000 0.138 0.121
2006 0.144 0.351 0.000 1.000 0.155 0.135
2007 0.184 0.387 0.000 1.000 0.160 0.202
2008 0.164 0.370 0.000 1.000 0.135 0.186
2009 0.121 0.326 0.000 1.000 0.116 0.124
2010 0.131 0.337 0.000 1.000 0.144 0.121
2011 0.128 0.334 0.000 1.000 0.152 0.110
Month of the year at the start of the spell
January–April 0.304 0.460 0.000 1.000 0.305 0.303
May–August 0.409 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.412 0.406
September–December 0.287 0.453 0.000 1.000 0.283 0.291
Time-varying covariate
Regional yearly GDP growth rate at job spell start 0.003 0.041 -0.071 0.180 0.004 0.002
Number of job spells 424,473 184,676 239,797
13The regional growth rate of the GDP varies on a yearly basis.
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To get a better idea of how many individuals collected UBs, in Figure 3 we report the take-
up rate of the standard UBs after the end of a job spell across the value of Z measured at the
termination date. Graphs a) and c) focus on the treated, while graphs b) and d) are for the
controls. The graphs at the top (a and b) are for job spells ending with a layoff. The graphs at
the bottom (c and d) refer to job spells ending due to worker resignation. Three features are
worth mentioning:
1. Graph a) shows a clear discontinuity in the UB take-up rate once the treated attain 52
weeks of working weeks in the last two years. The UB take-up rate is almost but not
always exactly zero when Z < 52. This might be due to measurement error induced, for
example, by an underestimation ofZ for individuals with multiple jobs. In addition, as has
also been observed in other countries (see e.g. Anderson and Meyer, 1997 for the US), the
UB take-up rate does not jump to 1 once eligibility is attained. This might be due to, for
example, the individual having moved to another job, self-employment, education, or not
having officially registered the unemployment status at the public employment office.14
2. For the controls, the UB take-up rate after layoff does not jump at the cut-off (graph b).
We can observe a very low fraction of the control group collecting UBs after layoff to
the right of the cut-off. In principle, they should not collect UBs because they do not
satisfy C.2. However, because we evaluated satisfaction of C.2 on the basis of data on
past employment history, there may have been some marginal measurement errors in the
construction of the administrative data.
3. Graphs c) and d) show that when job termination is due to the worker’s voluntary resig-
nation, it is very unlikely that the worker will collect UBs. For the treated group, very
few job spells are followed by UBs. In some special cases, workers can indeed collect
UBs to the extent that C.1 and C.2 are met and if the resignation was for ‘just cause’; as
mentioned in Section 3.
5 First evidence
We begin our analysis by providing suggestive evidence of the relationship between UB eligi-
bility and firing probability. We then estimate the local impact of UB eligibility on the firing
rate by means of a logit estimator and RDD analysis, which exploits the discontinuity in UB
eligibility at the 52nd accumulated working week during the C.1 biennium.
14A similar pattern is observed if we focus on temporary jobs terminated due to contract expiration (graphs avail-
able upon request).
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Figure 3: UB take-up rate after job termination by treatment status and termination reasons
Notes: We plot the fraction of individuals collecting UBs after the end of the job spell by accumulated working weeks (Z) at job termination.
5.1 Descriptive evidence
Figure 4 reports the Kaplan–Meier hazard rate of job separation for the 424,473 spells by
treatment status and reason of exit. Graph a) shows that both the treated and the controls have a
very similar profile in the job separation rate when we do not consider exits due to layoff: at the
beginning, the probability of job termination due to resignation or end of temporary/seasonal
contract is quite large and peaks at about four months of job seniority, with the probability of
leaving the job in a given interval of two weeks being about 3.6%. The peak is explained by the
probationary periods and the typical duration of many temporary contracts. Afterward, the job
hazard rate quickly decreases, declining to about 1%–1.4% at the 80th week of job seniority.
Several reasons can explain the decline in the hazard rate along the elapsed job duration:
bad job matches are dissolved quickly, temporary contracts are typically not long-lasting and
further heterogeneity generates selection over time and leaves only good matches in the sample.
The treated group shows a similar job exit rate at the beginning of a spell but a much lower
probability of exit once the first year has passed. Because treated individuals have more past
work experience, a longer job duration is expected. However, the difference in the job hazard
rate between the treated and the controls is reverted once we focus on the exits due to layoffs
only. Graph b) of Figure 4 shows that the layoff hazard rate of the treated is well above that
of the controls for most of the time, converging only when approaching the second year of
job seniority. Furthermore, the difference in the layoff rate is more substantial for individuals
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Notes: The elapsed job durations (T ) are grouped into intervals of two weeks. The reported job hazard rates are therefore probabilities
of leaving a job in a two-week interval, conditional on surviving until the beginning of that interval. The graphs are based on a weighted
kernel smoothing of the estimated hazard rates (Epanechnikov kernel function with a half-width of four). In graph a), the focus is on jobs
terminated because of resignation or the end of temporary/seasonal contract. Graphs b), c) and d) focus on layoffs. Graph c) considers
only spells with Z0 ≥ 20, while graph d) includes only spells with Z0 = 0. In all of the graphs, the job spells ending for the other reason
are right-censored when this happens.
starting the spell with a high level of Z0 (graph c), who are expected to attain UB eligibility
earlier. Treated units with Z0 = 0 (graph d) show a spike only after the 52nd week of elapsed
job duration, which corresponds to the moment when they attain UI eligibility. This suggests
that the eligibility attained by the treated during the spell might increase the chances of layoff.
5.2 Regression discontinuity design
In this subsection, we pooled over t the information on job exit and accumulated working
weeks, resulting in 6,110,657 observations. Each job spell contributes to this dataset until
either a job exit is observed or the spell is right-censored.
In a first analysis, we estimated pooled logit models with two different dependent variables:
i) a dummy equal to 1 if the spell ended in the subsequent two weeks because of layoff; and
ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the termination in the subsequent two weeks was due to resigna-
tion. We regressed these binary responses on the elapsed job duration t,15 the set of covariates
15This is specified with a set of dummies that are grouped every four weeks until the 64th week, every eight weeks
until the 88th week and a unique dummy from the 89th week onwards. This is the same specification used for
the baseline hazard in the duration models of Section 6.
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shown in Table 2 and the working weeks accumulated by the end of each t (Zt). The latter
non-parametrically enters the linear index of the logit model by a piecewise constant specifi-
cation with the accumulated working weeks grouped into two-week intervals. We estimated
the pooled logit models separately for the treated and the control groups. Since the job spells
started with different values of Z0, we can disentangle the duration dependence (t) from the
effect of the time-varying variable Zt, as per the previous literature (e.g. Rebollo-Sanz, 2012).
In our case, there is also a second identifying source that is of help in disentangling these: Zt
does not necessarily evolve along the job spell at the same rate as t (or does not evolve at all
over some t). This happens if, in the initial part of the C.1 biennium, the worker accumulated
work experience that is lost as the biennium moves during the spell.
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d) Controls exiting due to resignation
Notes: To draw these graphs, we: i) estimated logit models with the dependent binary variable equal to 1 if the layoff (graphs a and
b) or resignation (graphs c and d) is observed in the subsequent two weeks, as a function of a full set of 52 dummies for the values of
Z accumulated by the end of each t period grouped into two-week intervals and a set of elapsed duration dummies and covariates; ii)
estimated the predicted probabilities of job exit for each Z at the mean of the other covariates; iii) plotted the predicted probabilities along
with their quadratic fit to the left and the right of the 52 working weeks cut-off.
Figure 5 shows the predicted probabilities of job exit in the subsequent two weeks across
the accumulated working weeks (at the mean of the other regressors) along with their quadratic
fit to the left and the right of the cut-off of the 52nd accumulated working week. Recall that
our treated group is composed of spells that already satisfied the experience condition C.2
at the start of the job spell. These spells became eligible for UBs as soon as they satisfied
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the working weeks condition C.1. Hence, if UB eligibility has an impact on the firing rate,
we expect to observe a jump in the probability of layoff for the treated group as soon as the
accumulated working weeks exceed 52. In contrast, we should not observe any jump: i) for the
control group since for this group, satisfying the working weeks requirement is not sufficient
for UB entitlement; ii) when we model the probability of resignation. All of these intuitions
are confirmed by the graphs in Figure 5. Indeed, graph a) shows that the probability of layoff
suddenly grows from 0.6% to 0.7% when the treated reach the 52nd accumulated working
week, which is a substantial relative increase of about 17%. No jump at Z = 52 can be
detected in the remaining plots.16
We then formally exploit the discontinuity in UB eligibility and implement a sharp RDD
to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of satisfying condition C.1. In this RDD
setting, the accumulated working weeks zit of job spell i at elapsed duration t represent the
forcing variable. We compare the job separation rate just before and after the 52nd working
week. For simplicity, covariates are not included. We use local linear regressions with triangu-
lar weights and choose the bandwidth following the optimal mean squared error criterion as in
Calonico et al. (2014). The underlying linear probability model in error term form estimated
by RDD separately for the treated and the controls is:
ykit = α
k + δk · (zit ≥ 52) + βkzit · (zit < 52) + γkzit · (zit ≥ 52) + εkit, (1)
where
• ykit is equal to 1 if job spell i at elapsed job duration t will end within two weeks due to
reason k.
• (·) is the indicator function, which is equal to 1 if the argument is true.
• αk is the constant.
• zit is the accumulated working weeks at the end of the elapsed job duration t.
• βkzit · (zit < 52) is the linear relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome
to the left of the cut-off.
• γkzit · (zit ≥ 52) is the linear relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome
to the right of the cut-off.
• (zit ≥ 52) is a dummy indicator equal to 1 once the worker has accumulated at least 52
working weeks in the last biennium. The associated parameter δ is the discontinuity at the
cut-off (LATE) in the relation between the accumulated working weeks and the outcome.
• εkit is the idiosyncratic error term (with zero conditional mean).
16If we split the sample by year of hiring (before and after 2008), firm dimension (above and below 15 employees)
and geographical area (South and rest of Italy), we observe similar but more pronounced jumps after 2008, in
smaller firms and in the South. No discontinuity is visible for the other dimensions, however. These results are
in figures C.3–C.5 in Appendix C.
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Figure 6: RDD-predicted probabilities of job exit across the accumulated working weeks
Notes: These graphs report RDD plots for the dependent binary variable equal to 1 if the layoff (graphs a and b) or resignation (graphs
c and d) is observed in two weeks, where Z is the forcing variable with cut-off at 52 accumulated working weeks. We used local linear
regression with triangular weights and bandwidth following the optimal mean squared error criterion in Calonico et al. (2014).
Figure 6 graphically summarises the RDD estimation results. The RDD point estimates
along with further estimation details are in Appendix C, Table C.1. For the treated (graph a),
the RDD estimator yields an effect of 0.11 percentage points on the layoff probability (with
robust bias-corrected p-value equal to 0.031), which amounts to a 15% increase in relative
terms. The LATE for the controls is equal to 0.06 percentage points, which is insignificant at
the 10% level. Similarly, the effect on the resignation rate of the treated and the controls is 0.03
(p-value 0.681) and 0.04 (p-value 0.563) percentage points, respectively. These estimates are
very much in line with the predicted probabilities from the logit model estimates.17
6 Main estimation results
The empirical evidence in Section 5 suggests that UB eligibility boosts the probability of job
termination due to layoff. However, the assumptions to be satisfied in order to assign a causal
interpretation to the RDD estimates might be considered as too strong. First, the RDD approach
relies on the assumption of no manipulation of the forcing variable Z, meaning that firms and
17As found in the logit model, if we split the sample by year of hiring, geographical area and firm size, we estimate
a larger effect after 2008 (+31%, p-value = 0.000), in smaller firms (+22%, p-value = 0.003) and in the South
(+26%, p-value = 0.007). The LATE in the other dimensions is not significant at the 5% level (see tables C.1
and C.2 in Appendix C).
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workers should not fully control the accumulated working weeks. However, if the agents time
the firing according to UB eligibility requirements, we might expect a reduction in layoffs
for values of Z just below the 52 week eligibility threshold, which might upwardly bias the
estimates. Furthermore, agents manipulating the forcing variable may not be a random sample
and could have particular characteristics related to the probability of job termination. This
would imply that factors determining the outcome process do not evolve smoothly with respect
to the forcing variable, generating the failure of the their local continuity restriction (Hahn
et al., 2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Second, in Section 5, when analysing the probability
of job termination due to one reason, we simply right-censor job spells that were terminated
for other competing reasons, as if these exits were exogenously driven. However, the same
observed and unobserved determinants of one exit, including UB eligibility, could also affect
the job termination rate for other reasons, generating endogenous attrition in the longitudinal
dimension of our pooled dataset. Failure to appropriately account for attrition can bias the
estimation results. Third, for many workers, the cut-off at 52 accumulated working weeks
might coincide with the moment at which they reach a particular moment in their career. For
example, for the treated starting their job spell with Z0 = 0, the 52nd working week is likely to
be attained at one year of job seniority. If one year of job seniority is a milestone for the future
development of a career within the firm, for example, as an informal probationary period, a
confounding component would bias the RDD estimate.
In this section, we propose a mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model for duration out-
comes designed to overcome these problems and credibly claim that we identify the UB effect
on the firing rate. This is not free of cost. Modelling job exits using the MPH specifica-
tion imposes a parametric structure on the job duration distribution, since the hazard rate fully
characterises the corresponding duration distribution. This parametric structure, which is not
required in the linear probability model estimated by RDD, is the price that we pay.
First, we design our duration model so as to take into account the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity, which affects the sample composition over time and will allow us to compare
spells with different amounts of accumulated working weeks at hiring. Second, we model
competing risks of exit, jointly determined by observed and unobserved characteristics. Third,
we use both controls and treated spells and focus on their differential evolution in the job
separation rates both before and after the accumulation of 52 working weeks, as if in a DiD
design. The control group allows us to isolate the common impact of experience. By doing so,
we are able to net out confounding components related to work experience and job seniority that
might induce a spurious jump in the job separation rates for reasons other than UB eligibility.
We are also able to test whether there are anticipatory effects before the cut-off that would
violate the RDD assumption of no manipulation of the forcing variable Z. Finally, it allows us
to move from a local identification of the effect to a more general one across Z ≥ 52, avoiding
the sensitivity to manipulations just around the 52 weeks eligibility threshold.
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6.1 DiD hazard rate specification and results
The dependent variable is the job spell duration until either layoff or other type of termination
(resignation or end of temporary/seasonal contract). Therefore, we model two competing risks
of exiting a job: layoff l and other reasons o. The observed durations are grouped into time
intervals of two weeks. The time unit t ∈ N0 is therefore a two-week period. To avoid the
dependency of parameters to the time unit of observation (Flinn and Heckman, 1982), we
model the discrete-time process as in a grouped continuous-time model (van den Berg and
van der Klaauw, 2001). The transition intensity of a job spell to k ∈ {l, o} is specified with the
following MPH form:18
θk(t|xt, zt, d,vk) = exp
{
Γk(t) + Λ0k(zt) + β
′










• d is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the job spell belongs to the treated and 0 otherwise.
• exp[Γk(·)] is the piecewise constant baseline hazard common to all job spells. We use a
piecewise constant function since parametric assumptions that are too strict are a possible
sources of bias. The discrete time axis of the job spells is cut into 20 intervals.19 Let
the cut-points of the time axis be 0 = c0 < c1 · · · < c19 = ∞. The assumed piecewise




(cs−1 < t ≤ cs)γk,s. (3)
The 20 coefficients γk,s map the profile of the transition intensity towards risk k.20
• xt is the vector of covariates controlling for observed heterogeneity. Table 2 lists the full
set of covariates included in xt. Apart from the regional yearly GDP growth rate, all
other controls are time-invariant and measured at the beginning of the job spell. The con-
formable parameter vector β0k is the common impact of covariates, whereas β1k captures
the deviation from the common impact of the observables for the treated.
• zt is the time-varying variable measuring the number of working weeks determining the
satisfaction of C.1. It takes values of positive integers up to a maximum of 104. Its
value is updated at the end of each t. exp[Λ0k(zt)] is a piecewise constant function so
18In what follows, we omit the subscript i indicating job spell i for the sake of keeping the notation simple.
19To reduce the number of parameters to estimate, we assume that the profile changes every two time units (i.e.
every four weeks) until the 64th week. The profile is then allowed to change every four time units (i.e. every
eight weeks) until the 88th week. From week 89 onward, the baseline hazard is assumed to be constant.
20We imposed the innocuous normalization of γk,1 to 0 for all k ∈ {l, o}.
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as to flexibly retrieve the impact, common to everybody, of the accumulated working
weeks on the transition intensities. exp[Λ1k(zt)] is also a piecewise constant function
measuring the deviation from the common effect for the treated. To increase precision,
we regroup the support of Z into 10 intervals.21 Let the cut-points of the support of Z
be 0 = q0 < q1 · · · < q10 = 104. The assumed piecewise constant specification of the




(qs−1 < zt ≤ qs)λek,s. (4)
• vk ≡ (v1k, v0k) captures unobserved heterogeneity for the treated (v1k) and the controls
(v0k). The impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the transition intensities is treatment-
specific and therefore takes into account that the treated and the control group might
systematically differ in unobservables. We denote by G the mixing joint distribution
of V ≡ (V0l, V0r, V1l, V1r) with finite first moments. As explained in Appendix D, we
assume a discrete distribution with four points of support with unknown location of the
probability masses.
The parameters (λ1l,1, . . . , λ1l,10) characterise the different evolution of the effect of accu-
mulated work experience on the layoff transition intensity of the treated with respect to the
control group. They are therefore the parameters of primary interest. If employers and/or em-
ployees time layoffs with UB eligibility, then we expect the function Λ1l(Z) to display a sudden
profile change after Z = 52 (when only the treated attain UB eligibility) with respect to the
baseline interval of Z. We consider as the baseline interval the band of Z that is closest to the
cut-off in the pre-treatment period (43 < Z ≤ 51).22 Hence, by comparing the periods before
and after this cut-off, both for the treated and the control group, we measure the impact of UB
eligibility on the log transition intensity as in the usual DiD set-up for linear models of the
conditional mean of the outcome variable.23
The MPH specification of the transition intensities in Equation (2) is such that the system-
atic part, the impact of Z and the unobserved heterogeneity depend on the treatment status.
21The eight central intervals are equally spaced (eight weeks), the first is 12 weeks long (up to and including
week 11), the last goes from week 76 onwards to increase precision, as fewer individuals reach this level of
accumulated experience.
22Indeed, we normalised λek,6 to 0 for each e ∈ {0, 1} (i.e. controls and treated) and k ∈ {l, o}, which is the
impact of Z on the transition intensity when 43 < Z ≤ 51.
23Table C.3 in Appendix C displays the estimation results of the function Λl(zt) from an MPH model with com-
peting risks estimated using only the treated, similarly to Rebollo-Sanz (2012). If we use only the treated, we
cannot disentangle the impact of accumulated work experience from that of UB eligibility. Interestingly, how-
ever, we find that the layoff transition intensity clearly decreases in the accumulated working weeks up to the
moment of UB eligibility, when it suddenly jumps and then flattens out. After the 76th accumulated working
week, it regains its decreasing profile. This suggests a positive impact of UB eligibility on the layoff transition
intensity. However, the effect is likely to be downward-biased due to the observed negative relationship between
work experience and layoffs.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1904
The baseline hazard of each transition intensity is instead common to both the treated and the
controls. If the baseline hazards depend on the treatment status, then we could eventually re-
cover the effect of UI entitlement on the job layoff rate by separately estimating the job hazard
rate of the treated and the controls and taking the difference in the functions Λek(Z) for the two
groups (e = 0, 1). As such, under the MPH specification, regularity conditions on the MPH
components, the finiteness of the first moment of the mixing distribution G and the orthogo-
nality between the observed and unobserved determinants,24 we can invoke the identification
result in Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) for competing risks MPH hazard functions with
single-spell data.25
Similarly to the usual DiD set-up, some assumptions must be satisfied to recover the treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT) of UB eligibility on the layoff hazard rate from the difference
between Λ1l(Z) and Λ0l(Z), for Z ≥ 52. First, conditional on (v,x, zt), there should be no
time-varying unobservables determining the time to UB eligibility. If there were time-varying
omitted variables affecting both UB eligibility and the job hazard rate, then the impact of Z on
the layoff transition intensity for the treated and control groups would be different for spurious
reasons, not solely because of UB eligibility. In a standard DiD approach for linear conditional
means, this translates to the common trend assumption, which, in our case, means that the ac-
cumulation of work experience Z should have a common effect for both groups in the absence
of UB eligibility. Second, no anticipation over the baseline interval of the pre-treatment period
(44 ≤ Z < 52) should hold. If the treated reacted to the treatment during this reference period,
then the estimated effects were biased; see e.g. Ashenfelter’s dip (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985).
In our model, we flexibly estimate the function Λ1l(Z|Z < 52) in the pre-treatment period so
as to provide evidence that the data support the parallel trend and no-anticipation assumptions.
This is similar to the strategy that is often used in standard DiD design, consisting of including
leads of the indicator for the treated in the treatment period (see e.g. Autor, 2003).26
The transition intensities fully characterise the duration distribution. Hence, once we opt
for the MPH specification in Equation (2) and assign a particular distribution to the unobserved
heterogeneity, we can write down the sample log-likelihood as a function of a finite set of
parameters and maximise it with respect to these. Appendix D provides details on the derivation
of the log-likelihood function.
24The failure of the orthogonality condition between observed and unobserved determinants does not necessarily
imply a bias in the estimation of the effects of interest. We lose the possibility of giving a structural interpretation
to the coefficients of the observables (Cockx et al., 2013; Cockx and Picchio, 2013).
25The identification result in Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) is in continuous time, whereas our durations are
grouped into two-week periods. In a large Monte Carlo simulation, Gaure et al. (2007) assessed, however, that
time-of-events models a là Abbring and van den Berg (2003b) with time-grouped data are estimated without
bias when the time-grouping is incorporated in the derivation of the likelihood function. We therefore explicitly
took into account the time-grouping in the derivation of the likelihood function, as described in Appendix D.
26We also take into account that the treated and the control groups might differ in time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity. If not controlled for, this could also invalidate the DiD identification strategy as the selection
effects operating on individuals over the elapsed job duration might modify the sample composition of the two
groups in different ways. The results without unobserved heterogeneity are in tables B.1–B.3 of Appendix B.
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Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients λ̂1l,1, . . . , λ̂1l,10, which capture the impact of UB
eligibility on the layoff transition intensity. The full set of estimation results of the MPH model
are reported in Appendix A, Tables A.1–A.4. As soon as the UB eligibility kicks in, the layoff
exit rate of the treated jumps significantly by 12.2%.27 The increase in the job layoff transition
intensity stays at a similar level for about 16 weeks of work experience. Then, for Z ≥ 68, the
treated and control groups have similar layoff exit rates. The sudden but temporary increase in
the layoff transition intensity after UB eligibility suggests that the job matches that are meant to
be dissolved with an improvement in the employees’ outside option immediately take advantage
of the opportunity, as if the job mismatches were prearranged. Jobs surviving beyond the 76th
week are probably higher quality matches and the workers’ improved outside option is not large
enough to generate job destruction.
The placebo test for the pre-treatment period passes, as none of the coefficients of the pre-
treatment dummies λ̂1l,1, . . . , λ̂1l,5 are significantly different from zero. Furthermore, while
the Wald test of the joint insignificance of λ̂1l,7, . . . , λ̂1l,10 is confidently rejected at the 1%
level (p-value = 0.001), the coefficients in the pre-treatment period are jointly insignificant
(p-value = 0.352). Hence, when both the treated and the controls do not satisfy the eligibility
requirement for UB, their layoff exit rate evolves in a parallel way. This supports the validity
of our identifying assumptions.
Table 3: Estimated ATTs on the layoff transition intensity
Coeff. S.E.
Before UB eligibility (Z < 52)
1–11 accumulated working weeks (λ1k,e) -0.056 0.044
12–19 accumulated working weeks (λ2k,e) -0.009 0.044
20–27 accumulated working weeks (λ3k,e) 0.015 0.044
28–35 accumulated working weeks (λ4k,e) 0.012 0.044
36–43 accumulated working weeks (λ5k,e) 0.020 0.046
44–51 accumulated working weeks (λ6k,e) 0.000 -
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ7k,e) 0.115 ** 0.049
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ8k,e) 0.117 ** 0.056
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ9k,e) 0.063 0.062
76+ accumulated working weeks (λ10k,e) -0.082 0.055
Wald test H0: λ1l,1 = · · · = λ1l,5 = 0 p-value = 0.352
Wald test H0: λ1l,7 = · · · = λ1l,10 = 0 p-value = 0.001
Number of job spells 424,473
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
6.2 Sensitivity analysis
In Appendix E, we report several robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our DiD estimation
results of the ATTs. We re-estimate the MPH model after deleting seasonal jobs and after
keeping only open-ended contracts. We parametrically specify the baseline hazard to avoid
2712.2% = [exp(0.115)− 1] · 100.
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possible biases coming from too flexible specifications in the baseline hazard and unobserved
heterogeneity (Baker and Melino, 2000). We also change the definition of the treatment group.
According to our baseline definition, the treatment group is made up of the spells of workers
with at least one day and no more than two years of work experience during the C.2 period.
We test whether the results are sensitive to this choice by re-estimating the benchmark model
after modifying the maximum work experience to 26 weeks and 156 weeks. We check whether
the results are sensitive to the right-censoring of the controls becoming treated. We implement
a RDD estimator in the competing risks MPH model on the treated units only and including a
cubic polynomial specification across Z, with different coefficients to the right and left of the
cut-off. In all of these cases, the estimated ATTs were very close to those from the benchmark
model, and the RDD estimator delivers very similar results to the LATE estimates obtained on
pooled data in Section 5 (+15-17%).
Although we did not find evidence of significant anticipatory effects along Z grouped into
intervals of (mainly) eight weeks, in a further check, we test whether evidence of an antici-
patory effect shows up when the worker gets very close to the UB eligibility threshold of 52
accumulated working weeks. We do this by re-estimating the benchmark model with the piece-
wise constant specification of Λek(Z) augmented by a further dummy equal to 1 when Z = 51,
for k ∈ {l, o} and e ∈ {0, 1}. If, indeed, firms and employees adopt an opportunistic behaviour
and agree to wait until UB eligibility before firing, this should be reflected in a dip in the layoff
exit rate just before UB entitlement, generating an anticipatory effect with the opposite sign
than the one found in the after-treatment period. Model (11) in Table E.1 of Appendix E shows
that this extra dummy for Z = 51 has the expected negative sign, pointing to a reduction of
5.2% in the layoff exit rate just before UB eligibility, which may explain the different effect
estimated by implementing the RDD estimators (+15-17%) and the DiD estimator close to the
threshold (+12%). However, this anticipation effect is not significantly different from zero and
all of the other ATTs are close to those of the benchmark model.
Finally, we run a validation test, in the spirit of a placebo test, by estimating the impact of
UB eligibility on the (voluntary) resignation exit rate. Because the general rule is that workers
voluntarily resigning lose UB eligibility (see graph c in Figure 3), we do not expect significant
ATTs for Z ≥ 52. Operationally, we keep the competing risks structure unchanged, i.e. the
number of competing risks is still fixed to two, but now, one risk of exit is voluntary resignation
and the second risk is the residual category including all of the other exit risks (e.g. layoff and
the end of temporary/seasonal job). As expected, the estimated ATTs from this modified model
do not display any evidence of a sudden increase in the job exit rate for voluntary quitting.
6.3 Mechanisms
We find a sizable impact on the rate at which workers are laid off as soon as they acquire UB
eligibility. In this section, we aim to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms at play with
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the help of the information coming from possible heterogeneous effects. To get more insight
into the role of the economic situation, social norms and firing costs, we divide the population
into subgroups along geographical dimension, firm size and year of hiring, and re-estimate the
benchmark DiD model. The ATTs are reported in Table 4 along with the p-values from the
equality tests between the coefficients of each pair of independent samples (Clogg et al., 1995;
Brame et al., 1998).
The first dimension of heterogeneity is related to the economic situation, which changed
significantly after 2008. The Great Recession should have modified the incentives for moral
hazard of employers and employees in different directions. On the one hand, in economic
downturns or in periods of higher demand uncertainty, employers need to adjust their work-
force and exploiting UB eligibility may be a way to reduce the expected firing costs. On the
other hand, deteriorated economic conditions should make workers less willing to agree on job
packages that involve a certain probability of layoff once UB eligibility is attained: because the
probability of finding a new job decreases in downturns, the outside option is less valuable and
more risky.28 Panel a) shows that when splitting the job spells into those started before and after
January 2008, it seems that the latter are driving the findings for the whole sample. No effect
on the layoff transition intensity is detected among spells started before the economic crisis,
whereas UB eligibility boosts the layoff exit rate of job spells started after 2008 by 21.2% in
the eight weeks following UB eligibility and by 14.4% in the subsequent eight.
Second, we investigate the role of employers’ firing costs by dividing the sample between
firms with more and with fewer than 15 employees, a threshold that also coincides with differ-
ent EPL on layoffs. As explained in Section 3, firms with more than 15 employees face large
expected firing costs. By contrast, employers with less than 15 employees are subject to much
looser EPL and lower expected firing costs. Hence, smaller firms might more easily offer job
packages including, as a feature of the agreement, a probability of being laid off at UB eligi-
bility (Zweimüller, 2018). As shown in panel b) of Table 4, the effect is statistically significant
only for smaller firms, while for larger firms it is very close to zero. Because our estimates are
driven by firms with fewer than 15 employees, the results might suggest that low rigidity is a
driver of the effect. However, large and small firms differ on other dimensions besides different
EPL regimes. For example, stronger interpersonal relations and trust between employees and
their employer might play a more significant role in smaller firms and facilitate collusion to ex-
ploit the UB system. Nonetheless, we should be careful in interpreting these results; although
the point estimates of the ATTs are quite different in size between large and small firms, their
difference is not statistically significant.
Another driving force might be related to trust in society and social norms. Differences
in social norms could lead to heterogeneous responses to the same moral hazard incentive.
28In 2008, the UB system also became more generous to a certain extent, which might have increased the incentive
to exploit the UI system. The raise in the replacement rate was mild, however, and also applied to the ‘reduced’
UB for workers with very few accumulated working weeks. Therefore, it is unlikely to play a major role.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(3):
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. p-value
Panel a) Before 2008 After 2008
Before UB eligibility (Z < 52)
1–11 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,1) -0.093 0.065 -0.028 0.060
12–19 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,2) -0.029 0.065 -0.005 0.060
20–27 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,3) -0.023 0.065 0.034 0.061
28–35 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,4) 0.028 0.065 -0.017 0.061
36–43 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,5) 0.006 0.067 0.018 0.063
44–51 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,6) 0.000 – 0.000 –
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,7) 0.005 0.074 0.192 *** 0.067 0.061
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,8) 0.088 0.082 0.135 * 0.078 0.673
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,9) 0.032 0.091 0.100 0.086 0.584
76 or more accumulated working weeks (λ1l,10) -0.057 0.079 -0.113 0.076 0.610
Wald test H0: λ1l,1 = · · · = λ1l,5 = 0 p-value = 0.381 p-value = 0.862
Wald test H0: λ1l,7 = · · · = λ1l,11 = 0 p-value = 0.520 p-value = 0.000
Number of job spells 193,616 230,857
Panel b) Firms with more than than Firms with fewer than
15 employees 15 employees
Before UB eligibility (Z < 52)
1–11 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,1) -0.155 ** 0.070 0.041 0.056
12–19 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,2) -0.064 0.070 0.072 0.056
20–27 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,3) -0.028 0.071 0.079 0.056
28–35 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,4) -0.002 0.071 0.049 0.057
36–43 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,5) 0.108 0.074 -0.020 0.058
44–51 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,6) 0.000 – 0.000 –
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,7) 0.044 0.081 0.131 ** 0.063 0.395
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,8) 0.062 0.094 0.112 0.070 0.671
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,9) 0.021 0.104 0.040 0.078 0.881
76 or more accumulated working weeks (λ1l,10) -0.115 0.089 -0.110 0.070 0.962
Wald test H0: λ1l,1 = · · · = λ1l,5 = 0 p-value = 0.006 p-value = 0.389
Wald test H0: λ1l,7 = · · · = λ1l,11 = 0 p-value = 0.372 p-value = 0.003
Number of job spells 227,526 196,947
Panel c) South Centre-North
Before UB eligibility (Z < 52)
1–11 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,1) 0.002 0.064 -0.103 * 0.060
12–19 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,2) 0.096 0.064 -0.097 0.061
20–27 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,3) 0.079 0.065 -0.034 0.061
28–35 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,4) 0.067 0.066 -0.031 0.061
36–43 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,5) 0.053 0.068 0.001 0.062
44–51 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,6) 0.000 – 0.000 –
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,7) 0.150 ** 0.073 0.053 0.068 0.331
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,8) 0.216 *** 0.082 -0.024 0.079 0.035
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,9) 0.125 0.092 0.000 0.087 0.319
76 or more accumulated working weeks (λ1l,10) -0.046 0.084 -0.089 0.075 0.707
Wald test H0: λ1l,1 = · · · = λ1l,5 = 0 p-value = 0.304 p-value = 0.321
Wald test H0: λ1l,7 = · · · = λ1l,10 = 0 p-value = 0.005 p-value = 0.463
Number of job spells 121,301 303,172
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1904
There is evidence of different social norms between the South and the rest of Italy (Banfield,
1958). For example, according to the laboratory-in-the-field experiment in Bigoni et al. (2016,
2018) and the 2008 European Values Survey, people in the south of Italy have a much lower
level of trust in people and in society. With this general sentiment of distrust towards the oth-
ers, employers and employees may find it easier to feel justified in behaving opportunistically
and exploiting the UI system.29 Related to this, undeclared employment also occurs more in
the South than in the rest of Italy.30 In a society where undertaking undeclared work is more
widespread, firms and workers might more easily agree, once UB eligibility is attained, to offi-
cially terminate the official employment relationship but maintain it off the books. The surplus
coming from the UB could then be shared between both sides of the job relation, depending on
their bargaining power. Panel c) of Table 4 reports the estimation results of interest when we
split Italy into South and Centre-North.31 In the South, the layoff transition intensity increases
by 16.2% when UB eligibility is attained. The increase peaks at 24% between 60 and 67 weeks
of accumulated work experience and then fades away. In the rest of Italy, the effect of UB
eligibility is instead not significantly different from zero and the joint significance test of the
overall effect for Z ≥ 52 reported at the bottom of panel c) of Table 4 cannot reject the null
hypothesis. This suggests that the effect at the national level is mainly driven by the labour
market in the South. When testing whether the ATTs in the South are different from those in
the Centre-North, we find that only the difference in the effect for weeks 60–67 is significant
at the 5% level. The other ATTs, although quite different in size between the South and the
Centre-North, do not formally show a significant difference, due to the increasing standard er-
rors when we split the sample into subgroups. Although the sample size seems large, because
the duration increases at a similar rate as the accumulated working weeks, we start having a
problem of lack of precision when looking at the heterogeneity of ATTs.
In our administrative dataset, we cannot find information on job relations that are off the
books. However, if workers and firms agree on officially terminating the job relation to main-
tain it off the books once UB eligibility is attained, displaced workers who are entitled to UB
should display a higher probability of officially re-entering the same firm after UB exhaustion.
As shown in Appendix F, the probability of re-hiring by the same firm does not display discon-
tinuities at the eligibility cut-off measured at firing. This suggests that the larger effect detected
in the South is not linked to undeclared work replacing official employment. However, it does
not completely rule it out because the undeclared job relation could go on for many years.
29Guiso et al. (2004) exploit these geographical differences in Italy and find evidence that low trust in society
leads to lower financial development. In addition, low-trust areas are associated with a greater use of loans from
relatives or friends, as opposed to bank loans.
30According to the estimates in De Gregorio and Giordano (2015), irregular employment was 15.7% of total
employment in the South, compared with 9.8% for the whole country. Moreover, according to data collected by
the Italian Labour Inspectorate, each audit finds, on average, about 19% more undeclared jobs in the South than
in the rest of Italy, albeit the audits per firm in the South are more than twice as many as those in the Centre-North
(6.2% versus 2.9%). See C.4 in Appendix C for more details on these types of descriptive statistics.
31Southern regions are defined following the European NUTS1 category: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia,
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia.
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Deriving clear-cut policy implications from our estimated ATTs and their heterogeneity is
not straightforward. The main difficulty is obtaining data to credibly disentangle the detected
opportunistic behaviour in the moral hazard component on the firms’ side from that on the
employees’ side. If we could do this, then we would be able to suggest to what extent the
policy maker should intervene to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of firms, by introducing
an experience rating system to reduce layoffs, for example, and/or the moral hazard behaviour
of workers, such as by making the UB system less generous.
Although we do not have evidence regarding which side of the labour market mostly deter-
mines our empirical findings, there are several hints suggesting that the dominant moral hazard
is on the firm side. First, lower firing costs should not increase employees’ incentives to exploit
the UI system, but rather, employers’. Similarly, the boost in the layoff exit rate for workers
eligible for UB after 2008 might have little to do with the moral hazard of employees. The
Great Recession should have reduced the willingness of workers to opportunistically exploit
the UB system by lowering the value of the outside option. Furthermore, most of the layoffs in
our sample are due to economic reasons (91.8%) and not the misconduct of the worker (8.2%).
To gauge the importance of the first type of layoff in driving our findings, we redefine the two
competing risks by isolating layoffs for economic reasons in one of these and by including all
of the other reasons for job exit into the second risk. Table 5 reports the estimated ATTs on the
exit rate due to layoffs for economic reasons. They are very much in line with those from the
benchmark analysis.32 This corroborates the hypothesis that it might mostly be employers who
take the initiative for the layoff and, therefore, who drive our findings.33 Hence, we argue that:
i) the main driver of the estimated ATTs is likely to be employers’ moral hazard behaviour; and
ii) policy interventions targeted at reducing the moral hazard of firms, especially small firms,
should effectively contribute to reducing excessive layoffs.34
The importance of limiting excessive layoffs is not only related to the issue of the optimal
use of the UB system in protecting dismissed workers, but it also has indirect and long-term
implications that are linked to the time that the excess displaced workers take to find a new
job. First, excessive layoffs may increase the proportion of unemployed affected by stigma,
with lower re-employment possibilities (Canziani and Petrongolo, 2001). Second, if there is an
excessive number of layoffs entitled to UB, then there will be an excessive number of unem-
ployed workers with a reduced job-search effort and/or higher reservation wage. The larger the
32An analysis with worker misconduct as the outcome of interest gives compatible point estimates, though these
are rather imprecise given the limited number of layoffs attributed to such a reason (results available upon
request).
33We refrain from assigning to the observed reason for job termination the actual revealed initiative of one of
the two parties to terminate the job relationship, as they may have agreed on the formal reason for the job
termination.
34In this spirit, a 2013 labour market reform introduced a firing tax in Italy (Law 92/2012). Although this may be
a step in the right direction, the introduction of firing taxes may have unintended consequences in a dual labour
market such as the Italian market: permanent contracts risk becoming even less attractive than temporary jobs.
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Table 5: Estimated ATTs on the transition intensity of layoffs for economic rea-
sons
Coeff. S.E.
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,7) 0.124 ** 0.052
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,8) 0.107 * 0.059
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,9) 0.052 0.066
76 or more accumulated working weeks (λ1l,10) -0.066 0.057
Wald test H0: λ1l,1 = · · · = λ1l,5 = 0 p-value = 0.265
Wald test H0: λ1l,7 = · · · = λ1l,10 = 0 p-value = 0.004
Log-likelihood -1,463,163.6
Number of job spells 424,473
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
actual disincentive effects in looking for and accepting a new job, the more relevant this indirect
effect is for policy implications. In the economics literature, many studies link UB generosity
with an increase in unemployment duration (see, for example, the survey by Schmieder and
von Wachter, 2016). To gauge the extent to which this indirect implication could be relevant in
Italy, from our sample we select workers who were laid off and follow them over time from that
moment. We then estimate logit models for the probability of re-entering employment in six,
nine and twelve months from dismissal as a function of a full set of dummies for the value of
the working weeks accumulated at firing and the other covariates. We run the model separately
for the treated and the controls. Figure C.2 in Appendix C displays the predicted probabilities
across the working weeks accumulated at firing by treatment status. Interestingly, when firing
occurs at Z < 52, we find that both groups share a similar probability of finding a new job
in six, nine, and twelve months. Above 52 weeks, the re-employment probability suddenly
drops but only for the treated. These profiles indicate that the excessive layoffs detected in
the baseline model also have indirect and long-lasting consequences for the re-integration of
the unemployed entitled to UB into the labour market. This reinforces the need for a policy
intervention.
7 Conclusions
Unemployment insurance (UI) protects workers in the event of job loss and grants earnings
stability. Previous literature has shown that it introduces a moral hazard on the job-seeking
behaviour of the unemployed. In this paper, we show that this moral hazard is not only limited
to unemployment spells but also affects employment spells. As in most countries the eligibility
for unemployment benefits (UBs) depends on the amount of contributions to social security,
both workers and firms may behave strategically to satisfy such conditions and appropriate the
surplus coming from the UI system. UB eligibility may therefore distort firms and workers’
behaviour and affect the duration of existing jobs. The relative importance of moral hazard on
the firm’s and the worker’s side is an open question.
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In this paper, we investigated whether and to what extent layoffs are affected by the attain-
ment of UB eligibility during the job spell. In our empirical analysis we focus on Italy, a country
characterised by the lack of an experience rating system, like many countries in Europe. Wide
economic and cultural differences across regions and different levels of employment protection
legislation between firms make Italy an interesting case to study heterogeneity in response to
UB eligibility. We rely on an inflow sample of more than 400,000 new jobs drawn from admin-
istrative registries covering the period of 2005 to 2012. To identify the impact of UB eligibility
on the layoff transition intensity, we exploit the peculiarity in the eligibility conditions of the
Italian UI system. Our identification strategy is based on a difference-in-differences estima-
tor that compares the layoff probability of individuals before and after the attainment of UI
eligibility to a control group that cannot claim UBs.
We find robust evidence that UB eligibility increases the layoff exit rate by 12% as soon
as eligibility is attained. The effect persists for about 16 weeks. The sudden boost suggests
that the workers’ improved outside option can dissolve the most fragile job matches, while
it is not enough to terminate longer-lasting jobs. We detect significant heterogeneity in the
effects. The results are driven by layoffs of jobs started after 2008, in small firms and in the
South. A stronger effect during the Great Recession and in smaller firms is compatible with an
induced moral hazard on the employer’s side. First, in downturns, employees should have lower
incentives to shirk because the outside option is less valuable due to the greater difficulty in
finding a new job. Second, in Italy smaller firms have lower firing costs and therefore can more
easily take advantage of the UI system to adjust their workforce. Finally, only a small minority
of the layoffs observed in our sample are due to the misconduct of the worker. The results are
in line with the hypothesis that employers exploit the UB system for labour adjustments when
negative economic shocks occur (Zweimüller, 2018).
From a policy perspective, our study has important implications, not only for Italy. In con-
trast to the US, most European countries have not adopted experience rating systems which
require firms to pay unemployment taxes based on their use of UBs. Some countries have in-
troduced limited interventions targeting specific groups such as older workers (e.g. Delalande
tax in France and Arbeitslosengeld I in Germany), but they involve a small minority of jobs.
Since our findings suggest that the excessive layoffs might be due to employers’ moral hazard,
the introduction of an experience rating system may be of help to prevent firms from misus-
ing the UB system. Furthermore, its introduction should make jobs longer lasting, which may
have indirect positive consequences on productivity in the economy if longer-lasting jobs are
associated with gains in general and firm-specific human capital. Finally, as we found evi-
dence that the mass of excessive layoffs results in an excessive number of insured unemployed
workers with longer-lasting unemployment spells, re-aligning firms’ incentives is even more
fundamental.
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Appendix
A Full set of estimation results of the DiD MPH competing risk model
with unobserved heterogeneity
Table A.1: Impact of accumulated working weeks (Z) on transition intensities, Italy
Transition intensity for
Layoff transition intensity (l) other termination reason (o)
————————————————– ————————————————–
For everybody Deviation for the treated For everybody Deviation for the treated
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Cumulated working weeks (Z)
1–11 accumulated working weeks (λ1k,e) 0.636 *** 0.035 -0.056 0.044 0.995 *** 0.014 -0.067 *** 0.018
12–19 accumulated working weeks (λ2k,e) 0.454 *** 0.035 -0.009 0.044 0.646 *** 0.014 -0.058 *** 0.018
20–27 accumulated working weeks (λ3k,e) 0.271 *** 0.035 0.015 0.044 0.403 *** 0.014 -0.014 0.018
28–35 accumulated working weeks (λ4k,e) 0.179 *** 0.036 0.012 0.044 0.237 *** 0.014 0.004 0.018
36–43 accumulated working weeks (λ5k,e) 0.084 ** 0.037 0.020 0.046 0.121 *** 0.014 0.019 0.019
44–51 accumulated working weeks (λ6k,e) 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 –
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ7k,e) -0.068 * 0.040 0.115 ** 0.049 -0.110 *** 0.016 -0.018 0.021
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ8k,e) -0.207 *** 0.045 0.117 ** 0.056 -0.307 *** 0.018 -0.019 0.024
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ9k,e) -0.300 *** 0.051 0.063 0.062 -0.523 *** 0.021 -0.040 0.028
76+ accumulated working weeks (λ10k,e) -0.684 *** 0.049 -0.082 0.055 -0.796 *** 0.021 -0.203 *** 0.024
Wald test H0: λ1l,1 = · · · = λ1l,5 = 0 p-value = 0.352
Wald test H0: λ1l,7 = · · · = λ1l,10 = 0 p-value = 0.001
Number of job spells 424,473
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.2: Impact of covariates on transition intensities, Italy
Transition intensity for
Layoff transition intensity (l) other termination reason (o)
————————————————– ————————————————–
For everybody Deviation for the treated For everybody Deviation for the treated
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
(Age− 15)/100 -4.027 *** 0.292 3.459 *** 0.456 -4.316 *** 0.129 2.867 *** 0.217
(Age− 15)2/1000 1.177 *** 0.079 -0.853 *** 0.115 1.090 *** 0.036 -0.656 *** 0.055
Woman -0.208 *** 0.015 -0.075 *** 0.022 -0.065 *** 0.006 -0.029 *** 0.010
Ever received income support 0.254 ** 0.113 0.008 0.115 -0.011 0.054 0.088 0.056
Blue collar job in year before spell start 0.322 *** 0.028 0.087 ** 0.037 0.393 *** 0.011 0.042 *** 0.016
Employment contract in the calendar year before the start of the job spell - Reference: Temporary contract
Open-ended contract 0.181 *** 0.030 0.036 0.037 0.106 *** 0.013 -0.050 *** 0.017
Seasonal employment -0.135 *** 0.046 0.037 0.058 -0.096 *** 0.021 -0.002 0.027
No employment 0.073 *** 0.023 0.031 0.033 0.080 *** 0.009 -0.078 *** 0.014
Firm size - Reference: 5 or fewer employees
Between 6 and 15 -0.187 *** 0.019 -0.028 0.026 -0.125 *** 0.009 -0.003 0.014
Between 15 and 50 -0.335 *** 0.021 -0.028 0.029 -0.069 *** 0.009 -0.005 0.014
Between 51 and 100 -0.678 *** 0.022 -0.106 *** 0.032 -0.085 *** 0.009 0.023 * 0.014
More than 100 -0.641 *** 0.027 0.001 0.040 0.058 *** 0.009 0.039 *** 0.015
Type of contract - Reference: Open-ended
Temporary 0.022 0.016 0.031 0.023 -0.497 *** 0.007 -0.161 *** 0.011
Seasonal 0.869 *** 0.033 -0.307 *** 0.048 0.430 *** 0.017 -0.110 *** 0.026
Geographical area - Reference: North-West
North-East 0.066 *** 0.023 -0.080 ** 0.034 0.035 *** 0.008 -0.063 *** 0.012
Centre 0.211 *** 0.023 -0.067 ** 0.034 -0.033 *** 0.009 -0.074 *** 0.014
South 0.824 *** 0.021 -0.003 0.031 -0.044 *** 0.009 -0.042 *** 0.014
Islands 0.888 *** 0.026 -0.055 0.036 0.045 *** 0.012 -0.102 *** 0.018
Year at the start of the spell - Reference: 2005
2006 -0.169 *** 0.031 0.058 0.043 -0.070 *** 0.014 0.017 0.021
2007 -0.192 *** 0.036 -0.029 0.052 -0.079 *** 0.016 -0.028 0.025
2008 -0.015 0.037 -0.060 0.053 -0.029 * 0.017 -0.100 *** 0.027
2009 -0.236 *** 0.044 -0.038 0.063 0.036 * 0.020 -0.108 *** 0.031
2010 -0.319 *** 0.036 -0.011 0.051 -0.027 * 0.016 -0.131 *** 0.024
2011 -0.552 *** 0.040 0.058 0.055 -0.174 *** 0.017 -0.102 *** 0.026
Month of the year at the start of the spell - Reference: January–April
May–August 0.390 *** 0.018 -0.021 0.024 0.436 *** 0.008 -0.058 *** 0.011
September–December 0.303 *** 0.019 0.005 0.026 0.363 *** 0.008 0.000 0.012
Regional yearly GDP growth rate -1.149 *** 0.294 0.017 0.432 -0.171 0.129 0.188 0.205
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.3: Estimation results of the baseline transition in-
tensities, Italy
Transition intensity for
Layoff transition intensity (l) other termination reason (o)
——————————- ——————————-
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Elapsed job spell (weeks)
[1, 4] 0.000 – 0.000 –
[5, 8] 0.189 *** 0.019 0.401 *** 0.008
[9, 12] 0.285 *** 0.023 0.625 *** 0.010
[13, 16] 0.538 *** 0.026 0.917 *** 0.012
[17, 20] 0.446 *** 0.030 0.806 *** 0.014
[21, 24] 0.400 *** 0.034 0.779 *** 0.017
[25, 28] 0.652 *** 0.036 1.078 *** 0.018
[29, 32] 0.553 *** 0.041 0.905 *** 0.020
[33, 36] 0.517 *** 0.044 0.915 *** 0.022
[37, 40] 0.643 *** 0.047 1.020 *** 0.024
[41, 44] 0.625 *** 0.051 1.033 *** 0.025
[45, 48] 0.657 *** 0.054 1.076 *** 0.027
[49, 52] 0.656 *** 0.058 1.144 *** 0.028
[53, 56] 1.032 *** 0.059 1.453 *** 0.029
[57, 60] 0.957 *** 0.064 1.243 *** 0.032
[61, 64] 1.077 *** 0.068 1.330 *** 0.033
[65, 72] 1.262 *** 0.066 1.534 *** 0.033
[73, 80] 1.582 *** 0.075 1.855 *** 0.037
[81, 88] 1.665 *** 0.081 1.847 *** 0.040
[89, 104] 1.773 *** 0.082 1.884 *** 0.041
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant
at the 10% level.
Table A.4: Estimated unobserved heterogeneity distribution of the MPH transition intensities
and summary statistics of the estimation, Italy
Layoff transition intensity (l) Transition intensity for other termination reason (o)
————————————————– ————————————————–
Controls Treated Controls Treated
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Unobserved heterogeneity support points
v1 -5.132 *** 0.067 -5.079 *** 0.062 -3.505 *** 0.031 -3.203 *** 0.032
v2 -3.028 *** 0.171 -6.356 5.387 -1.658 *** 0.118 -4.411 ** 2.166
v3 -8.719 *** 0.360 -8.563 *** 0.428 -6.766 *** 0.154 -6.893 *** 0.175
v4 -6.294 *** 0.127 -6.469 *** 0.728 -4.375 *** 0.052 -4.512 *** 0.260
Unobserved heterogeneity logistic weights of the probability masses
λ1 1.015 *** 0.129
λ2 -1.944 *** 0.179
λ3 -1.730 *** 0.111
λ4 0.000 –







Number of parameters 201
Number of job spells 424,473
Number of time-spell observations 6,110,657
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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B Full set of estimation results of the DiD MPH competing risk model
without unobserved heterogeneity
Table B.1: Estimation results of the baseline transition
intensities, Italy
Transition intensity for
Layoff transition intensity other termination reason
——————————- ——————————-
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Elapsed job spell (weeks)
[1, 4] 0.000 – 0.000 –
[5, 8] 0.078 *** 0.016 0.304 *** 0.007
[9, 12] 0.081 *** 0.018 0.444 *** 0.007
[13, 16] 0.242 *** 0.020 0.647 *** 0.007
[17, 20] 0.057 *** 0.022 0.449 *** 0.008
[21, 24] -0.067 *** 0.025 0.345 *** 0.009
[25, 28] 0.104 *** 0.025 0.566 *** 0.009
[29, 32] -0.079 *** 0.028 0.313 *** 0.011
[33, 36] -0.190 *** 0.031 0.250 *** 0.012
[37, 40] -0.133 *** 0.033 0.287 *** 0.013
[41, 44] -0.225 *** 0.035 0.226 *** 0.014
[45, 48] -0.258 *** 0.038 0.203 *** 0.015
[49, 52] -0.337 *** 0.040 0.194 *** 0.015
[53, 56] -0.036 0.039 0.425 *** 0.015
[57, 60] -0.198 *** 0.044 0.129 *** 0.018
[61, 64] -0.148 *** 0.047 0.146 *** 0.020
[65, 72] -0.086 0.040 0.223 *** 0.016
[73, 80] 0.042 0.045 0.353 *** 0.018
[81, 88] -0.002 0.050 0.216 *** 0.021
[89, 104] -0.044 0.046 0.105 *** 0.019
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * signif-
icant at the 10% level.
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Table B.2: Estimation results of the impact of accumulated working weeks (Z) on
transition intensities, Italy
Transition intensity for
Layoff transition intensity other termination reason
————————————————– ————————————————–
For everybody Deviation for the treated For everybody Deviation for the treated
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Accumulated working weeks (Z)
1–11 0.409 *** 0.033 -0.038 0.040 0.740 *** 0.012 0.020 0.016
12–19 0.247 *** 0.033 0.053 0.042 0.426 *** 0.012 0.039 ** 0.017
20–27 0.125 *** 0.034 0.060 0.043 0.247 *** 0.013 0.056 *** 0.017
28–35 0.087 ** 0.035 0.049 0.044 0.137 *** 0.014 0.054 *** 0.018
36–43 0.040 0.037 0.033 0.045 0.072 *** 0.014 0.042 ** 0.018
44–51 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 –
52–59 -0.003 0.040 0.095 * 0.049 -0.044 *** 0.015 -0.048 ** 0.020
60–67 -0.062 0.045 0.076 0.055 -0.162 *** 0.018 -0.075 *** 0.023
68–75 -0.063 0.049 -0.006 0.060 -0.278 *** 0.020 -0.133 *** 0.026
76 or more -0.287 * 0.045 -0.123 ** 0.049 -0.370 *** 0.017 -0.282 *** 0.021
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
Table B.3: Estimation results of the impact of covariates on transition intensities, Italy
Transition intensity for
Layoff transition intensity other termination reason
————————————————– ————————————————–
For everybody Deviation for the treated For everybody Deviation for the treated
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
(Age− 15)/100 -2.692 *** 0.266 2.628 *** 0.418 -3.253 *** 0.101 2.409 *** 0.164
(Age− 15)2/1000 0.853 *** 0.072 -0.658 *** 0.105 0.835 *** 0.028 -0.544 *** 0.042
Woman -0.196 *** 0.014 -0.046 ** 0.021 -0.050 *** 0.005 -0.015 ** 0.008
Ever received income support 0.242 ** 0.107 0.037 0.109 -0.022 0.046 0.134 *** 0.047
Blue–collar job in year before spell start 0.230 *** 0.027 0.066 * 0.035 0.295 *** 0.009 0.033 *** 0.012
Employment contract in the last year before the start of the job spell - Reference: Temporary contract
Temporary contract 0.127 *** 0.028 0.048 0.034 0.055 *** 0.011 -0.043 *** 0.014
Seasonal employment -0.083 * 0.044 0.034 0.055 -0.042 ** 0.016 -0.006 0.021
No employment 0.076 *** 0.022 0.036 0.031 0.094 *** 0.008 -0.090 *** 0.011
Firm size - Reference: 5 or fewer employees
Between 6 and 15 -0.147 *** 0.017 -0.021 0.024 -0.094 *** 0.007 0.003 0.011
Between 15 and 50 -0.295 *** 0.019 -0.013 0.027 -0.041 *** 0.008 0.004 0.011
Between 51 and 100 -0.617 *** 0.021 -0.100 *** 0.031 -0.041 *** 0.007 0.017 0.011
More than 100 -0.617 *** 0.027 -0.037 0.039 0.084 *** 0.008 0.011 0.011
Type of contract - Reference: Open-ended
Temporary 0.125 *** 0.015 0.059 *** 0.021 -0.394 *** 0.006 -0.110 *** 0.009
Seasonal 0.844 *** 0.030 -0.219 *** 0.045 0.400 *** 0.012 -0.021 0.018
Geographical area - Reference: North-West
North-East 0.048 ** 0.022 -0.064 0.033 0.020 *** 0.006 -0.043 *** 0.010
Center 0.218 *** 0.023 -0.042 0.033 -0.031 *** 0.007 -0.037 *** 0.011
South 0.799 *** 0.020 -0.003 0.029 -0.058 *** 0.007 -0.024 ** 0.011
Islands 0.850 *** 0.024 -0.042 0.034 0.025 ** 0.010 -0.063 *** 0.014
Year at the start of the spell - Reference: 2005
2006 -0.137 *** 0.029 0.047 0.040 -0.049 *** 0.011 0.005 0.017
2007 -0.146 *** 0.034 -0.028 0.049 -0.045 *** 0.013 -0.027 0.020
2008 0.002 0.034 -0.046 0.049 -0.016 0.014 -0.086 *** 0.021
2009 -0.212 *** 0.041 -0.037 0.058 0.043 *** 0.016 -0.113 *** 0.024
2010 -0.278 *** 0.034 -0.001 0.047 -0.004 0.013 -0.130 *** 0.018
2011 -0.447 *** 0.038 0.073 0.052 -0.095 *** 0.014 -0.088 *** 0.020
Month of the year at the start of the spell - Reference: January–April
May–August 0.271 *** 0.016 -0.022 0.022 0.333 *** 0.006 -0.064 *** 0.009
September–December 0.169 *** 0.017 -0.063 *** 0.024 0.238 *** 0.006 -0.077 *** 0.009
Regional yearly GDP growth rate -1.042 *** 0.278 0.119 0.404 -0.136 0.105 0.258 0.160
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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C Further tables and figures
Table C.1: Sharp RDD estimates based on local linear regressions
Panel a) Outcome: exit due to layoff
Treated group Control group
Italy South Centre-North Italy South Centre-North
Coeff. (effect at cut-off Z = 52) 0.0011 0.0034 0.0004 0.0006 0.0014 0.0006
Robust p-value 0.0310 0.0070 0.3080 0.1010 0.2950 0.1200
Robust lower bound 95% CI 0.0001 0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0002
Robust upper bound 95% CI 0.0022 0.0054 0.0014 0.0013 0.0033 0.0017
Effect in % 0.1477 0.2596 0.0705 0.1070 0.1374 0.1493
Eff. number of obs. (Left) 434,856 154,089 330,294 658,079 139,030 245,014
Eff. number of obs. (Right) 320,549 105,381 244,323 448,039 95,866 203,940
Panel b) Outcome: exit due to resignation
Treated group Control group
Italy South Centre-North Italy South Centre-North
Coeff. (effect at cut-off Z = 52) 0.0004 0.0010 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003
Robust p-value 0.6810 0.2940 0.8400 0.5630 0.6020 0.7040
Robust lower bound 95% CI -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0018 -0.0013
Robust upper bound 95% CI 0.0017 0.0030 0.0020 0.0018 0.0032 0.0020
Effect in % 0.0234 0.0948 0.0113 0.0258 0.0378 0.0197
Eff. number of obs. (Left) 393,418 178,803 275,797 430,200 120,452 327,803
Eff. number of obs. (Right) 296,416 117,431 211,016 332,396 86,881 255,066
Notes: This table reports sharp RDD estimates using local linear regression. In Panel a (b) the dependent binary
variable ykit is equal to 1 if the layoff (resignation) is observed in two weeks. Z is the forcing variable with
cut-off at 52 accumulated working weeks. We used local linear regressions as in Calonico et al. (2014) with the
following options: triangular kernel; variance–covariance matrix estimated using the heteroskedasticity-robust
nearest-neighbour variance estimator; bandwidth selected based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth selector.
Table C.2: Sharp RDD estimates: heterogeneous effects
a) Treated group - layoff b) Treated group - resignation
Smaller Larger <2008 ≥2008 Smaller Larger <2008 ≥2008
Coeff. (effect at cut-off Z = 52) 0.0022 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0023 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0004
Robust p-value 0.0090 0.5160 0.8130 0.0000 0.9040 0.2430 0.9160 0.3860
Robust lower bound 95% CI 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0014 0.0013 -0.0023 -0.0007 -0.0024 -0.0007
Robust upper bound 95% CI 0.0039 0.0016 0.0011 0.0037 0.0021 0.0027 0.0023 0.0017
Effect in % 0.2218 0.0513 -0.0233 0.3152 -0.0078 0.0602 -0.0058 0.2530
Eff. number of obs. (Left) 207,873 205,942 270,149 407,058 169,298 226,983 163,001 449,965
Eff. number of obs. (Right) 160,133 170,842 200,841 267,739 138,501 182,961 139,014 286,513
Notes: This table reports sharp RDD estimates using local linear regression by firm size (≤ or > 15 employees)
and year of hiring (< or ≥ 2008). In column a (b) the dependent binary variable ykit is equal to 1 if the layoff
(resignation) is observed in two weeks. Z is the forcing variable with cut-off at 52 accumulated working weeks.
We used local linear regressions as in Calonico et al. (2014) with the following options: triangular kernel;
variance–covariance matrix estimated using the heteroskedasticity-robust nearest-neighbour variance estimator;
bandwidth selected based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth selector.
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Table C.3: The impact of accumulated working weeks
on the layoff transition intensity with unobserved het-
erogeneity for the treated
Before UB eligibility (Z < 52)
1–11 cumulated working weeks (λ1l,1) 0.482 *** 0.032
12–19 cumulated working weeks (λ1l,2) 0.378 *** 0.031
20–27 cumulated working weeks (λ1l,3) 0.221 *** 0.030
28–35 cumulated working weeks (λ1l,4) 0.147 *** 0.028
36–43 cumulated working weeks (λ1l,5) 0.085 *** 0.028
44–51 cumulated working weeks (λ1l,6) – –
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 cumulated working weeks (λ1l,7) 0.069 ** 0.031
60–67 cumulated working weeks (λ1l,8) 0.024 0.038
68–75 cumulated working weeks (λ1l,9) 0.096 ** 0.045
76 or more cumulated working weeks (λ1l,10) -0.500 *** 0.049
Log-likelihood -672,615.7
Number of job spells 184,676
Number of parameters 121
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * signifi-
cant at the 10% level.
Table C.4: Data on frequency of labour inspections across regions
Number Number Undeclared Ratio Ratio undeclared
of firms of audits jobs found audits/firms jobs/audits
(2015) (2016) (2016) (%)
Piemonte 316,258 9,768 2,552 3.1 0.261
Valle d’Aosta 11,223 155 56 1.4 0.361
Liguria 120,647 5,137 1,156 4.3 0.225
Lombardia 786,798 14,758 3,985 1.9 0.270
Trentino Alto Adige 83,418 – – – –
Veneto 384,164 7,985 2,305 2.1 0.289
Fiuli-Venezia Giulia 81,566 3,446 609 4.2 0.177
Emilia-Romagna 360,034 10,406 3,322 2.9 0.319
Tuscany 314,456 10,854 3,502 3.5 0.323
Umbria 65,261 3,935 498 6.0 0.127
Marche 124,092 5,096 1,112 4.1 0.218
Lazio 417,132 11,990 4,526 2.9 0.377
Abruzzo 95,791 5,017 1,211 5.2 0.241
Molise 20,360 2,361 562 11.6 0.238
Campania 330,569 14,043 6,698 4.2 0.477
Puglia 245,374 15,164 5,164 6.2 0.341
Basilicata 34,215 6,849 949 20.0 0.139
Calabria 104,153 8,133 2,812 7.8 0.346
Sicilia 259,346 – – – –
Sardinia 100,816 6,826 2,030 6.8 0.297
Italy 4,339,091 141,920 43,048 3.3 0.303
South (no Sicily) 830,462 51,567 17,396 6.2 0.337
Centre-North (no Trentino Alto Adige) 3,082,447 90,356 25,653 2.9 0.284
Sources: The number of firms comes from ISTAT, Risultati economici delle imprese, retrieved from
http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCSP_SBSREG. The number of audits and the number of
undeclared jobs come from National Labour Inspectorate, Monitoraggio gennaio-dicembre 2016, re-
trieved from https://www.ispettorato.gov.it/it-it/studiestatistiche/Pagine/Monitoraggio-trimestrale-attivita-
di-vigilanza.aspx.
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Figure C.2: Predicted re-employment probabilities in 6, 9 and 12 months since firing across the
accumulated working weeks (Z) at layoff
(a) In 6 months after layoff
(b) In 9 months after layoff
(c) In 12 months after layoff
Notes: The re-employment probabilities are predicted at the sample mean of the covariates. They are calculated after the estimation of logit
models for the probability of re-entering employment in 6, 9 and 12 months from dismissal, as a function of a full set of dummies for the
value of the accumulated working weeks at firing and the other covariates and separately for the treated and the controls. The solid curves
are quadratic fits of the predicted probabilities, separately computed to the left and to the right of the cut-off of 52 accumulated working
weeks.
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Figure C.3: Logit estimates of the relation between the accumulated working weeks (Z) and
the probability of job exit in 2 weeks by year of hiring
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Figure C.4: Logit estimates of the relation between the accumulated working weeks (Z) and
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Figure C.5: Logit estimates of the relation between the accumulated working weeks (Z) and
the probability of job exit in two weeks by firm size
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D Likelihood function and estimation of the DiD MPH competing risk
model
In this appendix, we describe the likelihood function and its derivation for the DiD MPH model
in Subsection 6.1. The contribution to the likelihood function of job spell i is fully characterised
by the transition intensities specified in Equation (2). If the job spell is right-censored after t
periods, then its contribution is given by the survivor function until the end of the t-th time unit:












where τ ∈ and Θ is the set of unknown parameters. If the job spell i is complete and ends
in k, then its contribution to the likelihood function, which is derived below, is as follows:
Lki (t|xit, zit, di,vi;Θ) =
θk(t|xit, zit, di, vik)∑
r∈{l,o} θo(t|xit, zit, di, vik)
× [S(t− 1|xit−1, zit−1, di,vi)− S(t|xit, zit, di,vi)]. (D.2)
Because the likelihood contribution is conditional on the unobservables in vi, we need to
integrate them out after imposing an assumption on their distribution G. To avoid parametric
assumptions that are too strict, we follow Heckman and Singer (1984) and assume that the
vector vi ≡ (vi0l, vi0o, vi1l, vi1o) is a random draw from a discrete distribution function with
four points of support.35 The probabilities associated with the mass points sum to one and, for
m = 1, 2, 3, 4, are denoted by
pm=Pr(v0l=v0lm, v0o=v0om, v1l=v1lm, v1o=v1om)≡Pr(v = vm)




exp(λg) m = 1, . . . , 4 λ4 = 0.
35Although Gaure et al. (2007) suggested choosing the number of support points that minimises the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC), we had to limit their number to four for computational reasons, given that we have to
process more than 6 million job-time observations in the benchmark model. When progressively increasing the
number of support points up to four, the AIC showed decreasing values.
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unconditional on unobserved heterogeneity is:







i (t|xit, zit, di;Θ,vm) + (1− ci)Lki (t|xit, zit, di;Θ,vm)
]
. (D.3)
The sample log-likelihood function which we maximised with respect to the parameters (Θ, λ1,
λ2, λ3, v1,v2,v3,v4) is given by the sum across the job spells of the natural logarithm of
Equation (D.3).
E Robustness checks
First, we investigate whether our findings are sensitive to the removal of seasonal jobs from the
sample, as these are likely to be quite a different type of contract, serving different technological
purposes, than open-ended or fixed-term contracts (Model (1) in Table E.1). In the same vein,
we retain only permanent jobs in Model (2). In Model (3), the estimation is run using only
permanent jobs as in Model (2), but we add additional covariates such as sector, daily salary
and collar type in the specification of the transition intensities. These variables are potentially
endogenous as forward-looking agents could respond on these margins by anticipating future
UI eligibility. Consequently, we excluded them from the benchmark analysis. The estimated
ATTs from these three alternative sample definitions and/or model specifications are very much
in line with those of the benchmark model, but somewhat larger. For example, when in Model
(2) we keep only permanent workers in the sample, the increase in the layoff exit rate amounts
to 15.1% and 19.8% at 52–59 and 60–67 accumulated working weeks, respectively. A more
substantial effect on permanent jobs was expected because these jobs are more likely to result
in firing than temporary positions, for which the employer typically waits until the end of the
contract to get rid of the worker.
Second, we parametrically specify the baseline hazards to avoid possible biases coming
from too flexible specifications in the baseline hazard and unobserved heterogeneity (Baker
and Melino, 2000). As in Baker and Melino’s (2000) simulations, in Model (4) we use a cubic
polynomial in durations for the baseline hazards of both competing risks. The estimated ATTs
are very much in line with those of the benchmark model.
Third, because the right-censoring of the controls becoming treated (i.e. eligible for C.2)
could be endogenously selective, in Model (5) we consider the change in the treatment status
occurring during the spell as a job exit towards the residual termination reason. By doing so,
we endogenously take into account the eventual compositional change in the control group. In
this check, the point estimates of the ATTs are also close to those of the benchmark model.
In Model (6), instead of right-censoring the controls that become treated during the job spell,
we retain them and model their job hazard rate while keeping them in the control group. By
By defining ci as the dummy indicator equal to 1 if spell i is censored and 0 if it is complete,
the contribution to the likelihood function of spell i with duration ti (complete or incomplete),
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doing so, we contaminate the control group, because now they satisfy C.2 and in the moment
at which they accumulate 52 working weeks over the previous two years, they will be entitled
to UB. The estimated effects are therefore expected to be biased towards zero. They can be
interpreted as intention-to-treat (ITT) effects or lower bounds of the true effect. Model (7) is
like (6) but focuses only on job spells in the South.36 As expected, the estimated ITT effects
are biased towards zero but still significant and sizable in the South.
Fourth, we check the sensitivity of our results to the definition of the treatment group.
According to our definition, the treatment group is made up of spells of workers with at least
one day and no more than two years of work experience during the C.2 period. We limited
the work experience to a maximum of two years to enhance comparability with the controls,
who have no work experience during the C.2 period. In this robustness check, we test whether
the results are sensitive to this choice by re-estimating the benchmark model after modifying
the maximum work experience to 26 weeks in Model (8) and 156 weeks in Model (9). The
latter reproduces results very similar to those of the benchmark model. Model (8) also returns
a point estimate of the ATT at 52–59 accumulated working weeks very close to that of the
benchmark model, translating into a boost in the layoff exit rate of about 11%. Because we are
losing a large part of the treated group,37 the increase in the standard errors makes the estimated
effect not significantly different from zero (p-value 0.102). The point estimate of the ATT for
the subsequent interval is instead halved with respect to the benchmark model. However, the
standard error increases by almost 30% with respect to the baseline model. Therefore, the
resulting 95% confidence interval largely encompasses the corresponding estimate from the
benchmark model.
The fifth robustness analysis is a validation test in the spirit of a placebo test. We estimate
the impact of UI eligibility on the (voluntary) resignation exit rate. Because the general rule
is that workers voluntarily resigning lose UB eligibility (see graph c) in Figure 3), we do not
expect significant ATTs for Z ≥ 52. Operationally, in Model (10) we keep the competing risks
structure unchanged, i.e. the number of competing risks is still fixed to two, but now one risk
of exit is voluntary resignation and the second risk is the residual category including all other
risks of exit (e.g. layoff and the end of a temporary/seasonal job). As expected, the estimated
ATTs of Model (10) do not display any evidence of a sudden increase in the job exit rate for
voluntarily quitting.
Although we did not find evidence of significant anticipatory effects along Z grouped into
intervals of (mainly) eight weeks, in a sixth robustness check, we test if evidence for an antic-
ipatory effect shows up when the worker gets very close to the UB eligibility threshold of 52
accumulated working weeks. We did this in Model (11) by re-estimating the benchmark model
with the piecewise constant specification of Λek(Z) augmented with a further dummy equal to
36The ITT effects in the Centre-North are also close to zero. They are available upon request.
37They decrease from 184,676 to 88,677.
In Model (6), instead of right-censoring the controls that become treated during the job spell,
we retain them and model their job hazard rate while keeping them in the control group. By
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1 when Z = 51, for k ∈ {l, o} and e ∈ {0, 1}. If indeed firms and employees opt for an oppor-
tunistic behaviour and agree to wait until UB eligibility before firing, this should be reflected in
a dip in the layoff exit rate right before UB entitlement, generating an anticipatory effect with
the opposite sign from the one found in the after-treatment period. Model (11) in Table E.1
shows that this extra dummy for Z = 51 has the expected negative sign, pointing to a reduction
of 5.2% in the layoff exit rate right before UB eligibility. This coefficient is not significantly
different from zero, however, and all of the other treatment effects are close to those of the
benchmark model. If we instead repeat the same robustness check only in the South (Model
(12)), which is where we found the strongest effect on layoffs, then the anticipatory dummy
implies a decrease in the layoff exit rate of 25.2%, with a p-value of 0.054.38
Finally, as an alternative identification strategy, we implement a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) estimator in the duration setting by removing the control units and including a
cubic polynomial specification across Z, with different coefficients to the right and left of the
cut-off (available upon request). We find that at the cut-off, the layoff exit rate significantly
jumps by 17.5% (p-value 0.001). This effect is very much in line with the results in the bench-
mark model, especially if one considers the slight overestimation coming from the dip right
before the cut-off (–5.2%) detected in Model (11).
To conclude, it is worth noting that in some specifications, the ATT at 76 or more accumu-
lated working weeks is significantly negative. However, this is not robust across models and is
also present in the validation test on resignations. As Z increases, control units become more
and more selective because they represent spells of workers with no previous experience during
the C.2 period but who survive for at least 76 weeks in the same job. While our model exten-
sively controls for (observed and unobserved) differences between treated and controls, we
acknowledge that the comparison may become harder for the very last values of Z. Hence, we
refrain from interpreting the coefficient of the differential exit rate for the treated for Z ≥ 76.
For the other coefficients, the robustness checks confirm the reliability of the estimates.
38The coefficients of the other dummies for the pre-treatment period are not significant even at the 10% level,
suggesting that an anticipatory effect is present only very close to the eligibility threshold. In the Centre-North,
we do not observe the anticipatory effect at the 51st week, which is in line with the lack of effect above the 52nd
week (results are available upon request).
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Table E.1: Robustness checks on the estimated DiD ATTs
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Removing all temporary jobs
Removing seasonal jobs Removing all temporary jobs + sectors, wage, collar
(1) (2) (3)
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,7) 0.1199 ** 0.0505 0.1407 ** 0.0658 0.1311 ** 0.0656
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,8) 0.1509 *** 0.0574 0.1805 ** 0.0737 0.1610 ** 0.0731
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,9) 0.0937 0.0636 0.1504 ** 0.0814 0.1237 0.0800
76+ accumulated working weeks (λ1l,10) -0.0535 0.0565 -0.0006 0.0738 -0.0131 0.0698
Number of job spells 401,674 146,539 146,539
Modelling the exit of Retaining
controls that become controls that
Parametric baseline treated become treated (ITT)
(4) (5) (6)
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,7) 0.0987 ** 0.0491 0.1053 ** 0.0494 0.0769 0.0473
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,8) 0.0946 * 0.0559 0.0981 0.0562 0.0640 0.0533
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,9) 0.0334 0.0621 0.0271 0.0625 0.0312 0.0587
76+ accumulated working weeks (λ1l,10) -0.1018 * 0.0545 -0.1711 *** 0.0563 0.0176 0.0501
Number of job spells 424,473 424,473 424,473
South: retaining Treated: less than 26 Treated: less than 156
controls that weeks of experience in weeks of experience before
become treated (ITT) the biennium before hiring the biennium at hiring
(7) (8) (9)
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,7) 0.1445 ** 0.0690 0.1015 0.0622 0.0945 ** 0.0447
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,8) 0.1739 ** 0.0770 0.0643 0.0717 0.0811 0.0503
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,9) 0.1253 0.0858 0.0795 0.0792 0.0345 0.0554
76+ accumulated working weeks (λ1l,10) 0.0384 0.0772 -0.1883 *** 0.0701 0.0180 0.0472
Number of job spells 121,301 328,474 467,127
Including dummy for South: including dummy for
ATTs on resignation Z = 51 to capture Z = 51 to capture
(Validation test) anticipatory effects anticipatory effects
(10) (11) (12)
Anticipatory effect at Z = 51 -0.0530 0.1032 -0.2909 * 0.1514
After UB eligibility (Z ≥ 52)
52–59 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,7) 0.0364 0.0339 0.1083 ** 0.0509 0.1151 0.0752
60–67 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,8) 0.0269 0.0390 0.1100 * 0.0574 0.1800 ** 0.0839
68–75 accumulated working weeks (λ1l,9) 0.0713 0.0441 0.0565 0.0636 0.0893 0.0934
76+ accumulated working weeks (λ1l,10) -0.1079 *** 0.0374 -0.0896 0.0559 -0.0831 0.0856
Number of job spells 424,473 424,473 121,301
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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F Re-hiring in the same firm
In this appendix, we empirically check whether the probability of being re-hired in the same
firm changes around the UI eligibility threshold. First, we select from our sample job spells in
the South that end with layoff. We then estimate the probability of re-entering the same firm
within 18 months from the layoff with a logit model, as a function of a full set of dummies
for each value of Z measured at firing and conditional on the same covariates used in the
specification of the benchmark duration model. Figure F.1 displays the predicted probabilities,
at the means of the covariates, for each value of Z at firing by treatment status in the South. For
both the treated and the control groups, the predicted probability of re-entering the same firm
within 18 months is quite flat across the accumulated working weeks and, for the treated group,
does not jump at 52 accumulated working weeks. Finally, we obtain very similar findings if
we focus on the probability of re-entering the same firm within nine months (available upon
request).
Figure F.1: Predicted re-employment probabilities in the 18 months since firing across the
accumulated working weeks (Z) at layoff in the South
Notes: The re-employment probabilities are predicted at the sample mean of the covariates. They are calculated after the estimation of a
logit model for the probability of re-entering employment in the 18 months since dismissal as a function of a full set of dummies for the
value of the accumulated working weeks at firing and the other covariates and separately for the treated and the controls. The solid curves
are quadratic fits of the predicted probabilities, separately computed to the left and to the right of the cut-off of 52 accumulated working
weeks.
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